Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Monday, March 09, 2009

3.9.50


3年前,在更顿群培画廊看到过用芭比,做的一件行为艺术作品,可惜当时没拍照。几天新闻网上看到消息说藏式“芭比娃娃”出炉了。福喜妹一个有加米名字的博日普姆。而且巨贵, 3000元一个妹妹。 Indeed, I have no interest in Barbie, but again just read - today is Barbie's 50th Birthday. I didn't know before that Barbie is manufactured by Mattel, Inc. and launched in 1959.3.9. What a coincident! After 50 years, Barbie is on top of the world. Today, maybe 福喜妹, the lucky and happy girl from Tibet is also happily celebrating world barbie girl's 50th....

Another 3.9,Tibetan Human Rights, Tibet Menschenrechte, Les droits de l'hommet du Tibet and 西藏人权网,中国第一个以西藏人权为主题的网站今天开通了。十几个板块,4种语言....very comprehensive information in English, German, French and Chinese, but Tibetan language!

Monday, January 12, 2009

谁为谁而纪念

任何事物的产生和发展都有其原因和结果
这世上,没有无缘无故的爱
也没有无缘无故的恨

今天看“两会”新闻,说会议将审议九届人大常委会第7次会议提交的《西藏自治区人民代表大会关于设立西藏百万农奴解放纪念日的决定(草案) 》的议案。而西藏自治区人大常委会副秘书长庞伯解释说:“议案就是要让包括藏族在内的全体中华民族永远牢记50年前西藏“民主改革”这一历史性事件,从此西藏百万农奴翻身得解放,挣脱了旧的封建农奴制度枷锁成为国家的主人。”

消息一出,网络上就有支持的声音了。说这事早该做了,而且建议大力宣传。是啊,翻身农奴年年在西藏庆祝这个,纪念那个,就是没有所谓的农奴日。早就应该有了!? But, Why, Why Now? Where is this bill coming from?

Last year, someone in the states suggested "...exile Tibetans should observe a Day of Solidarity and Unity. such ceremonial practice would help make emotional connections between younger and older generations as well as between Tibetans in exile and those inside Tibet." 记得去年年底,一位流亡藏人曾经建议为了显示对于境内藏人的支持,只用空洞语言来形容他们的牺牲是不够的。流亡藏人一定要积极地表达他们的尊敬,并且提供人道的援助。流亡藏人必须制定一个支持与团结的纪念日。因为纪念日不仅将会长久地维系这些分开来的家庭,而且也会给不同的世代带来情感上的连结,也会给境内与境外的藏人带来命运与共的感觉。

才几个月,外面民主的社会,似乎根本就没有讨论此事的迹象。但山这边的社会主义专政已在人大商讨类似议案了。不记得谁说的,加米虽然不能什么都是世界领先,但有超强的学习能力。看来真的是这样啊,倾听不同的声音,并付诸行动。

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

群众“不明真相”是官员失职【转】

“一小撮别有用心的人”、“不明真相的群众”、“黑恶势力幕后指使策划”……近些时候,一些较大的群体性事件发生之初,总能看到地方政府这样匆忙定性的词语。贵州“瓮安事件”、云南“孟连事件”,以及最近的甘肃“陇南事件”,事发之初,都能看到这样的“定性怪圈”。

“不明真相的群众”,似乎将群众看成没有独立人格、自由思想的“愚民”和逆来顺受的“顺民”,他们的不满一定是因为受到了蒙蔽、迷惑、挑唆和煽动。与之相对的,官员及其决策者则明白真相,掌握真理,难以犯错。

这样的定性,与这个时代完全脱节。有网民调侃“不明真相”说,这“不仅侮辱了群众的人格,还侮辱了群众的智商”,他们揶揄总结说,群众总是“不明真相”的,闹事的总是“别有用心”的,黑恶势力总是能“煽动群众”的,死者家属总是“情绪稳定”的……

经过30年的改革开放,中国社会已进入“黄金发展时期”与“矛盾凸显时期”并存的阶段。体制转换、结构调整、社会变革,在广度上已涉及经济、政治、文化等所有领域,在深度上已触及人们具体的经济利益。利益调整凸显了新的矛盾,就业、分配、腐败等问题成为人们关注的焦点。社会矛盾一旦遇到“导火索”,就容易爆发为大规模群体性事件、呈现出突发性、对抗激烈、社会破坏力强,处置难度大等特点。群体性事件频发有其深刻的社会背景。绝大多数群体性事件都是由于群众切身利益受到侵犯,利益诉求长期被漠视而引发。

分析近年来全国影响较大的群体事件,几乎都有一个共同的规律:起因很小-基层反应迟钝-升级为群体性事件-基层无法控制-震惊高层-迅速处置-事态平息。在冲突萌芽和聚集的初期,一些地方的基层党委政府对社会矛盾普遍表现出“体制性迟钝”——反应迟钝,判断失误,处理失当,导致“小事拖大,大事拖炸”,集中暴露出执政能力薄弱的软肋。

为了给这样的“体制性迟钝”寻找遁词,一些地方官员在应对群体性事件时,倾向于走极端,延续“寻找敌人”的专政思维,简单粗暴地“扣帽子,揪辫子,打棍子”。面对危机,他们首先想到的不是努力化解矛盾,而是上升到“政治高度”,对事件超前定性,把群众利益诉求“泛政治化”:要么认定“一小撮别有用心的人挑唆煽动”,要么认定为“有黑恶势力操纵”,然后把公安机关推上一线,采取高压手段解决问题。这么做,实际是一些官员揣着明白装糊涂,想借此推托自身应该承担的失职渎职责任。因此,在某种意义上,胡乱定性的官员才是群体性事件中真正“别有用心的人”。

如果说,在新中国建国初期,由于外部存在境内外敌对势力的持续威胁,内部存在土匪、特务等一些遗留问题,专政思维还有其时代合理性的话,那么,在执政已经60年的今天,一些官员思想上、行为上依然存在的“专政”惯性,说明他们还没有理解中国共产党从革命党到执政党的时代转变,更没有理解好、执行好执政为民这一党的根本宗旨。

“瓮安事件”中,基层党委政府匆忙将事件定性为“有组织、有预谋”,是黑恶势力煽动群众围攻政府,并在当地媒体大规模刊播“瓮安群众愤怒谴责不法分子”等新闻,引起了更多群众的反感和猜疑。后来,还是贵州省委书记石宗源指出这起事件的“真相”:一些长期积累的社会矛盾没有得到应有的重视和妥善的解决,干群关系紧张、治安环境不好,一些地方、一些部门在思想意识、干部作风和工作方法上还存在很多问题,群众对我们的工作不满意。

在“寻找敌人”的同时,一些官员还习惯于封锁消息,控制舆论,制造出“不明真相的群众”。长期以来,在突发性公共事件发生后,保持沉默、回避媒体已经成为一些基层党委政府条件反射式的“自觉行为”,但在传播手段多样化、传播对象大众化的情况下,这种紧要关头的“失语”必然丧失引导舆论的主动权,看似避免承担责任的风险,实际却陷入被动,增加了平息事态的难度。

群众不明真相是官员的渎职。群众有权利了解真相,出现群众“不明真相”的情况,正是一些地方执政者的失职。因此,一些地方被“不明真相的群众”冲击、打砸,执政者首先要反躬自省。“不明真相的群众”暴露的是一些官员对民意的漠视,以及对“权力必须接受监督”这一法治理念的强烈反感。在少数官员的脑袋里,他们根子上就漠视公民的基本权利,更何况“公民知情权”。《政府信息公开条例》早已颁布实施,但是公众最想知道、需要知道、应当知道的不少信息却无法公开。比如,最近,沈阳市民温洪祥要求公开政府办公费、招待费、差旅费等费用,就被官员答复为“极其敏感,难度很大”。

一方面是群众无法了解真相,另一方面,一些公布的“真相”往往是群众无法接受的“假相”。看着那些群体性事件新闻“通稿”,我常常想问这些起草发布者3个小问题:“如果死者是你的母亲,你情绪能不能稳定?”“为什么群众跟黑帮走而不是跟政府走?”“别有用心的人究竟是些什么人?”

在构建和谐社会的历史潮流下,为政者应当转变思维,变社会控制为社会博弈,最终走向社会契约。前段时间的重庆出租车罢运事件,以官民互动的谈判、协商方式圆满解决,不就充分证明了中国可以跳出所谓“专政”的“周期率”吗?

文/《瞭望》新闻周刊记者黄豁

Thursday, November 27, 2008

Rock U, Chinese Democracy



I always enjoy James Reynold's reports and Qs....Always There!

And here, after Gun N' Roses's Chinese Democracy! James goes" An American rock ban releases a new album called "Chinese Democracy" what is the Chinese government response to such even?   Boom.... Mr.Qin Gang, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman replyed: "According to my knowledge, a lot of people don't like this kind of music - because it's too noisy, and too loud. James, I think you are a mature adult, aren't you?

说记者问外交部发言人秦刚:美国一个乐队“抢与玫瑰” 发行了一张名为《中国民主》的新专辑,中方对此有何反应? 秦笑眯眯地答:据我了解,很多人不喜欢这类音乐,因为它太嘈杂,噪音太大。我想你应该是一个成熟的成年人吧?

什么跟什么呀!摇滚,民主,成年人,音乐 ..... 所以的一切一切的一切,在中国都是噪声,都是污染....

It don’t really matter 其实无所谓
You’ll find out for yourself
你们自己终究会发现
No it don’t really matter
不,其实它无所谓
You’re gonna leave these thing to
Somebody else
你们总是会将这样的事情留给别人去做

If they missionaries
如果那些传教士
Real time visionaries
现实世界的幻想家
Sitting in a Chinese stew
坐在中国这口热锅上
To view my dis-infatu-ation
看见我的清醒
I know that I’m a classic case
我知道我是一个典型案例
Watch my disenchanted face
观察我不再迷醉的脸
Blame it on the Falun Gong
怪罪给法轮功吧
They’ve seen the end and you can’t hold on now
他们已经看到结局,而你却支持不住了。
Cause it would take a lot more hate than you
To stop the fascination
因为需要太多的仇恨才能阻止它的魔力
Even with an iron fist
即使你有一个铁拳。
Our baby got to rule the nation
我们的孩子将会统治这个国家
But all I got is precious time
而我拥有的只是宝贵的时间

It don’t really matter
其实无所谓
Gonna keep it to myself
你可以保密
No it don’t really matter
不,其实它无所谓
So you can hear it now from
Somebody else
所以你现在可以从别人那里听到这些信息

Cause it would take a lot more time than you
因为你的时间不够
I’ve got more masturbation
我有更多的自我满足
Even with your iron fist
即使伴随着你的铁拳
Our baby got to rule the nation but all I got is
Precious time
我们的孩子将统治这个国家但我所拥有的只是宝贵的时间
Our baby got to rule the nation but all I got is
Precious time
我们的孩子将统治这个国家但我所拥有的只是宝贵的时间

It don’t really matter
其实无所谓
Gonna keep it to myself
你可以保密
No it don’t really matter
不,其实它无所谓
So you can hear it now from
Somebody else
所以你现在可以从别人那里听到这些信息

You think you got it all locked up inside
你以为可以把一切都封锁起来。
And if you beat them all up they’ll die
以为痛打他们,他们就会死去。
Then you’ll walk them home for the cells
然后把牢房当作他们的家
Then now you’ll dig for your road back to hell
这样的话你就是在为自己挖掘回到地狱的路
And with your makes you stop
是你自己让自己灭亡
As if your eyes were their eyes you can tell
In your lack of time
如果你能用他们眼睛看到,就会知道自己的时间已经不多了

Saturday, November 08, 2008

True & False

社科院公布白领工资标准 拉萨月入900就是白领
中国社会科学院公布的2007年全国主要城市白领工资标准,包括各城市物价水平、居住成本、交通成本、城市现代化等诸多方面因素。香港月入18500元,北京5000元,广州4750元才算白领(单位:人民币)。外地务工者在以下基础上增加1800元。共分七档。
一档:香港18500,澳门8900;
二档:上海5350,深圳5280,温州5020,北京5000
三档:杭州4980[杭州白领工资标准你说我说] ,广州4750,苏州4300,厦门4100,青岛4000;
四档:南京3780,福州3380,无锡3200,天津3150,济南3120,大连3000;
五档:郑州2880,昆明2800,武汉2680,海口2600,长沙2480,三亚2360,重庆2250,沈阳2100,乌鲁木齐2100,西安2080;
六档:成都1900,哈尔滨1700,呼和浩特1700,贵阳1600,长春1500,兰州1500,银川1100,西宁1000;
七档:拉萨900
http://bbs.chinatibetnews.com/viewthread.php?tid=811&highlight=

Here is the report from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the standard monthly wages of white-collar workers in China. Surprisingly, Lhasa, the capital of Tibet Autonomous Region is listed at the bottom with 900RMB($130)/month. As 18,500RMB($2,700) per month, Hong Kong is listed on the top line. Beijing and Shanghai, with 5,000RMB and 5,350 are grouped in the second level.

But then,,just after few days on Xinhua News and released by National Bureau of Statistics of China on average wage level cross China. Tibet(32,436RMB) rank the top three, with Beijng(39,663RMB) on the first and Shanghai(39,004RMB) on the second place.

I am not quite sure how these calculation been done and where were these data source from? Interestingly, the article also listed top three average wage level in different sectors. The financial industry, is considered as the top industry, and followed by IT on the second and electric power, gas, water production and supply on the third place. It is almost impossible that Tibet could make average wage as higher as than Guangfdong or Nanjing, or even Sichuan, given these sectors are just rising industry in Tibet. But then....What is What? True things are false, for if the things be true

各省市工资水平排序 北京上海西藏居前三名

据国家统计局反馈的资料,截止到今年三季度末,江苏城镇单位在岗职工平均工资水平仍然位居北京(39663元)、上海(39004元)、西藏(32436元)、天津(27687元)、浙江(23603元)、广东(23078元)之后,在全国各省(自治区、直辖市)中排列第7位。

不同的行业,职工平均工资也存在差距。前三季度排在前三位的依次为:金融业42838元,信息传输、计算机服务和软件业36600元,电力、燃气及水的生产和供应业35380元。

http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2008-10/29/content_10269839.htm

Thursday, September 25, 2008

Who Spread AIDS!


I think this is extremely cool. 胡老师英语 会传播艾滋病 Teacher Hu's English can spread AIDS.Is that true? I laughed; we all laughed; at office. I even sent this picture to my colleague, 'Hu' whom we have always call “胡老师 Teacher Hu” to get the answer for the issue we are always talking - How HIV is spread in Tibet and elsewhere? so here we are, the answer!

Sunday, November 18, 2007

Three Gorges

一向拒绝跟团游,但这次为了顾全大局,我也跟团游了一回三峡。也不知道是我呆木,还是没找对感觉,总之三峡一游挺让我失望的。少了媒体报道中的震撼,多了更多人为的缺憾。


Monday, October 15, 2007

GDP翻两番

锦涛15号在十七大报告中提出,实现人均国内生产总值(GDP)到2020年比2000年翻两番。这么严肃的问题,怎么我就马上联想到“气候预测”和那个“GDP与狗屎”的笑话。

说两个学经济的学生在路上为了一点点小事争得面红耳赤,谁都说服不了谁。正当争执得不可开交的时候,两人看到了路边有一堆狗屎,甲就对乙说:如果你吃了这堆狗屎,我就给你5000万。乙想了想,把狗屎给吃了,虽然很不舒服,但甲给了乙5000万。二人继续走,心里都有点不平衡,甲白白损失了5000万,什么也没捞着。乙虽说赚了5000万,但是吃了坨屎心里也堵得慌。这时又发现一坨屎,乙终于找到了平衡,对甲说:你把它吃了,我也给你5000万。甲一想损失的5000万能赚回来,吃坨屎算什么,乙不是也吃了吗?于是也把屎吃了。按理说这下二人该平衡了,但是他们越琢磨越觉得不对劲,两个人的资本一点也没有增加,反而一人吃了一坨屎。于是就去找教授,教授听了他们的诉说,颤颤巍巍地伸出一个手指,激动地说:1个亿呀,1个亿!同学们,你们应该高兴啊,你们仅仅吃了两坨屎就为咱们国家贡献了1个亿的GDP!”

政治家预测经济发展感觉是天气预报,而学经济的又只能纸上谈兵。虽说是气象出生,但还是觉得学经济更实在。跟着翻两番的报道,经济学家林毅夫也提出了中国GDP翻两番面临的12大制约因素,包括能源和土地资源问题、教育问题、资本问题、技术进步问题、金融体系效率低下问题、市场分割和地方保护问题、出口增长可持续问题、收入分配问题、就业问题、腐败问题、经济波动问题、国有企业问题。2020年,又一个数字游戏。

Saturday, August 04, 2007

为什么不维权?

朋友总爱拿“法院转让”跟我开玩笑。可我觉着这笑话,也确实反应了一些现实的社会问题。首先,“....转让”是随处可见的街头标志。而至于“法院”一事,其实也是维权的一个笑话而已。一个可有可无的机构、一个几乎被人遗忘的机构、一个一小撮人最爱窜门的机构。因为嘎德的画,今天一晚上都在看维权文章,觉得下面一文很不错,值得思考。

在中国,对于权利并非没有明确的界定。但是,中国却每时每刻都在发生权利被侵犯的事件。相对于强势政府的普通老百姓,相对于强势商家尤其是垄断企业的普通消费者,相对于强势城市的普通农民工,在这些力量的较量中,后者总是得不到应有的权利保护。

中国人,你为什么不维权?我想,大致有三个原因:一是维权意识萎缩,无意识则无行动。大多数人,在明知利益受到侵犯时,考虑再三,往往是自认倒霉,息事宁人。维权意识萎缩的原因之一是怕打击报复,打击报复产生的侵权是中国常有的事件,比如河北的郭光允;二是维权渠道不畅,维权代价太高。如果侵犯自己利益的是政府,这个维权成功的希望十分渺茫。我国《国家赔偿法》实施十年,才赔偿数百万。维权行动往往令维权者心力交瘁,甚至得不偿失,这样高昂的代价也使维权者望而却步。广东专门为工伤者打官司的周立太律师说,按照正常程序打完一个断手的案子,正常要1074天。官司即使胜诉,企业主也可以通过一夜消失或者宣布破产来逃避赔偿;三是普通民众在信息不对称的情况下,缺乏必要的维权知识,很多时候即使利益受到侵犯,也懵懂不知。为什么政务公开那么难?因为不公开才可以暗箱操作,不透明才可以混水摸鱼。为什么农民工发生工伤愿意私了,接受一个比国家法律规定要低很多的赔偿结果?因为农民工大都缺乏对有关法律的了解。这三个原因交织在一起,仿佛三股凉水,使维权的星火归于沉寂。

当然,中国也有维权者,甚至有一些如王海一样的专业维权者。中国也还有消费者权益保护协会、工会等维权组织。但是,我们看到,这些维权者和维权机构,其进行的维权行动,很少得到来自公众的呼应。在明哲保身的思想作祟下,中国尽管人口众多,却是一盘散沙。沉默的大多数袖手旁观,助长了侵权者的嚣张气焰,最终使很多维权行动善始而不得善终。

在我看来,观察中国社会的进步,维权状态是一个线索,也是一个标志。现代社会是一个对权利有明确界定,并给予有力保护的社会。大多数人沉默着,逆来顺受,任凭强势者蹂躏自己仅有的权利,这不是一个进步的社会。我想,中国人维权要星火燎原,有三个方面的工作不得不做:一是改善国民性,唤醒民众的权利意识,使其团结。维权机构要广泛建立并受到法律保护,能够强有力的开展工作。改革开放27年,利益主体多元化,经济蓬勃发展,但中国始终没有一次类似文艺复兴那样倡导自由、平等、博爱的思想启蒙。我认为建立在集权、忍受、机会悬殊基础上的市场经济,是畸形的,也是脆弱的;二是改革政府,尤其是司法体制。一方面,要限制政府权力,避免其对民众权利粗暴的干涉和鲸吞。主要是反腐败;另一方面,要促使政府加强对民众权益的保护,通过促进竞争,打击暴利行为,发展社会保障事业,基本的医疗和教育事业等来不断改善民众的生活。司法是整个社会最后的防线,要改革司法,使其在公正的基础上,更有效率;三是要竭力提高信息对称程度。比如政务公开,涉及公众的政策要广泛听证。提高信息对称程度的另外一个关键,是要发挥新闻媒体的作用。

第一个方面是自救,第二个方面是他救,第三个方面是互救。我个人以为,以中国当前的实际,他救是核心之举。但以人类社会的发展历史看,求人不如求己,自救才是根本。

Thursday, July 12, 2007

China Shuts Down NGO Newsletter


Really sucks! China just bans most influential NGO & development newsletter from Beijing.
On July 4, Beijing municipal police raided the Beijing office of China Development Brief, an independent publication that has been operating in China since 1996 that reports on social development and civil society in China. Both the English and Chinese versions of the publication have been banned charged with illegal publishing of the Chinese version. Nick Young, the founding editor who contributes regularly to the English edition, has been deemed guilty of conducting “unauthorized surveys” under the 1989 Statistics Law and now faces possible deportation. Over the past 27 years since international NGOs have been operating in China, this is a rare instance of one being shut down.
This is really a discouraging news, and I am so disappointed. Really, no matter where I live China Development Brief always have been very helpful. It is very informative, and always with in-depth studies on issues and problems in the field of development, in particularly development of China. But now, foreign readers as well as general population will lose resource and information!
China Development Brief
Reporting the latest news on China's social development
Below is a statement that Nick Young have sent to the police officer who interviewed him last week.

Dear Policeman Kang,
In order to assist your investigations, I am pleased to supply you with the following background information on what I have been doing in China over the last twelve years. I would ask you to kindly pass this information to your leaders.

Early Years
I established China Development Brief in 1995, when I was living in Yunnan Province, producing the first issue in January 1996. At first it was a print newsletter, published and distributed by a social development research institute at the City University of Hong Kong. At the end of 1997, that institute and I terminated our relationship and I continued to publish and distribute the newsletter through a sole-proprietor business I established for that purpose in Hong Kong.

In the early years, China Development Brief was a specialist, English language newsletter aimed at international organisations providing development assistance to China. At that time, China was receiving more than USD 4 billion each year in government-to-government, multilateral and private aid from overseas. China Development Brief was the only regular and independent publication reporting on how that money was spent. The purpose of the newsletter, as expressed by its mission statement at that time, was "to increase the effectiveness of international aid to China."

For the first 18 months I produced the newsletter single handed. After that, I was joined by a Canadian Chinese volunteer who worked with me full-time for a little more than one year, during which time we also recruited a young Yunnan University graduate to work as an editorial assistant.

Early subscribers to our publication:

Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and UN system agencies (roughly 10% of the total)

The international aid agencies of donor governments, such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan , Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the UK. (roughly 10% of the total)

Private international aid donors and agencies, including grant-making foundations and operational NGOs (roughly 70% of the total) Although the total aid to China provided by these agencies was much less than that of governmental and multilateral agencies, they were relatively numerous and, given their smaller budgets, had fewer resources for networking and background research to inform their programming; therefore, it was natural that they should comprise our most significant readership, and that the publication should concentrate on meeting their information needs

Foreign correspondents and media reporting on China (roughly 5% of the total)

Academic institutions and individual scholars based overseas (roughly 5% of the total)

Middle Years
In the summer of 1999, I relocated from Kunming, Yunnan, to Beijing , and started to develop a small team ofâ€"mainly Chineseâ€"colleagues to expand China Development Brief's publishing activities. In addition to our regular publishing of the English language newsletter, we:

Published an English language Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (1999)

Published an English language Directory of 250 Chinese NGOs (2001)

Created a Chinese language newsletter (from 1999), compiled and written by Chinese staff, to serve as a "capacity building tool" for China's non-profit sector by sharing information about minjian charitable activity to inform social organisations, scholars and government officials. This newsletter has, from its inception, been under Chinese editorial control. (My Chinese is by no means good enough to edit Chinese text so even at the start my role was limited to providing advice and encouragement.) In 2003, this Chinese edition was formally passed to the ownership of a small team of Chinese staff. It and the English language publishing team, which I continue to head, have continued to share office premises, a common brand, and common values, although the ownership, management and financing of the two operations are now separate.

Published a Chinese language Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (2005). The purpose of this venture was to help interested parties in Chinaâ€"including government officialsâ€"to understand the diverse nature, motivations, aims and methods of international NGOs.

Later Years
At the end of 2004, after the separation of the English and Chinese language editions, I re-structured our English language publishing, closing the print magazine and converting to web publishing. (Our material is now posted on a website operated from a UK server, with a monthly newsletter delivered by email.)

At this point, I changed the mission statement of our English publishing, re-articulating it as: "To enhance constructive engagement between China and the world."

This change in publishing method and in mission reflected the changes that had occurred in China and world over the previous decade. The Internet was now used widely (whereas in 1995 when I created the first publication, Yunnan Province was only just beginning to be developed). This greatly increased the amount of information published about China and about the topics that we had been covering.

At the same time, because of the worldwide development of interest in the idea of "corporate social responsibility," many global businesses with operations in China were taking more interest in social issues, and I felt that the publication should no longer have a narrow focus on international "aid," but speak also to a wider range of international entities connected in some ways to China. This was particularly pertinent because, in the light of China's booming economy, many of the Western government donors were beginning to close their aid programs to China.

Meanwhile, and most importantly, after several years in which the West's attention had mainly been focused on the US-led "war on terror," China's peaceful rise was being increasingly noticed and commented upon by Western media, think-tanks and NGOs that did not necessarily have "aid" programs in China.

A great deal of that Western commentary was more or less openly hostile to China, presenting it as a threat to global peace and environmental sustainability and as a place where a cruel, totalitarian government rules over a population who care about nothing except their family's immediate economic interests.

I felt that this was grossly unfair and potentially harmful to the interests of both China and the wider world. It is unfair because, in my view:

Much of the instability in the world still arises from the actions of Western powers (eg, the invasion of Iraq)

A wealthy (and mainly white) minority of the world's population consumes a disproportionately large share of the world's resources and bears the major responsibility for degradation of the global environment

After 150 years of instability and economic blight, China is resuming the place in the world that it fully deserves to occupy and most Chinese people are justly proud of this achievement. I believe that China's senior leadership recognises the need to grow in ways that are environmentally sustainable and socially stable. The international community should recognise, with sympathy and respect, the enormous difficulty of the tasks facing China, rather than simply berating China and encouraging Western populations to fear China.

Mainly, I have been motivated by the fear that, as China continues to grow, Western attitudes towards China may harden, provoking a hardening of Chinese attitudes, and potential trade, diplomatic and even armed conflicts that will serve the interests of precisely no-one.

These views have been consistently apparent in China Development Brief's published editorials over the last two yearsâ€"while our feature articles and news reports have continued to cover a broad range of social issues in ways that seek to represent fairly the government of China's policies and approaches as well as those of international organisations, Chinese scholars, and Chinese non-profit organisations.

A few specific examples will illustrate this editorial approach:

February 2005, Editorial: "China has historically been the subject of more white racism than almost any other country or culture."

March 2005, Editorial criticising Chinese "AIDS activists" in Henan Province: "Now is the time to work with government, not against it."

April 2005, Editorial criticising an irresponsible US State Department grant to a Chinese NGO: "Labour rights groups will stumble if pushed to run too soon."

October 2005, Editorial: "China cannot develop equitably without stable government and leadership; and, apart from the [Communist] Party, there is no other contender for administrative power."

September 2005, Editorial on the impacts of "colour revolutions" on NGO-government relations in China : "International NGOs and foundations . . . should continue to put their case calmly, patiently and, above all, transparently. Their situation is not helped by those in the United States who bray about 'democracy' in ways that inevitably strike much of the world as ideologically imperialist. But this is all the more reason for the NGOs to explain clearly to [the Chinese] government at all levels exactly how they work, and why. And international organisations that are not committed to operating transparently should pack their bags and leave as they have nothing of value to offer the country."

March 2006, Editorial on China's environmental NGOs: "Despite China's security anxieties (heightened by the US State Department's bizarre view of NGOs as a proxy for American interests), green NGOs in China are loyal and patriotic and they still expect and want the government to take a lead."

February 2007, Editorial criticising an Amnesty International report on internal migration in China as being "facile": "This document is not a good starting point for understanding what is going on in China. It shows little or no recognition of the complex forces at work in China's government and society, or of the fact that discrimination against migrants is historically embedded, not just something that 'the government' does to them . . . China's political leaders are not schoolchildren to be ticked off and told to do better; and there are no simple policy switches that can be flicked to make everything alright . . . groups like Amnesty need to learn to treat China with more respect, or they will never be taken seriously here."

April 2007: Editorial on family planning policies argues that these have "played a key role in China's social and economic transformation." It goes on to point out: "Foreigners have generally been quick to deplore the authoritarian nature of the [birth control] policy but slow to acknowledge its role in China's escape from poverty. Even as the world at large grows anxious about China's carbon footprint and the spillage of its population overseas, there is widespread reluctance to acknowledge it might have been a good idea to prevent an extra 800 million Chinese feet from treading on the planet."

In summary, I have constantly striven, as per our mission statement, and for negligible personal gain, to encourage foreigners to approach China constructively, looking for ways to cooperate rather than ways to merely criticise.

In addition to the hundreds of thousands of words I have written in this constructive vein, my views have been sought privately by literally hundreds of international aid agencies, NGOs and businesses. In private as in print, I have repeatedly urged all of them to be transparent about what they do and to work as closely as they can with the Chinese authorities, taking the time and showing the respect that is necessary to develop meaningful relationships.

I have been equally open in my relationships with Chinese organisations, individuals, media and government officials.

Ministry of Civil Affairs and National Peoples Congress professional staff have in the past actively sought my views on the development of charity in China and on the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework.

On many occasions I have been invited to make presentations to conferences convened by Chinese government agencies in cooperation with international organisations such as the European Union and the Asian Development Bank.

I have on several occasions been hired by agencies close to the government of Chinaâ€"such as the China Association for NGOs (CANGOS) and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviationâ€"to provide training services for Chinese NGOs.

I have also provided consultancy, training and conference support services to Chinese government agenciesâ€"such as provincial Environment Protection Bureau, Education Bureau, Women's Federation, Agriculture Bureau and Civil Affairs staffâ€"through arrangement with international organisations funding development programs of various kinds.

I have been quoted many times in Chinese print media, and have been invited on seven or eight occasions to appear as an expert commentator on CCTV English language programs (including one live broadcast).

I have been aware over the last two years that China Development Brief has been watched closely by the Chinese security services. I have been as informative and helpful as I can to them, because I believe it is better to work for mutual understanding than to remain in the dark of mutual suspicion and hostility. I have paid out of my own pocket for meals eaten by people who are vague about their identity but who I believe to be security agentsâ€"supplying them, all the while, with information and analysis.

In short, I consider myself to be a very good friend of China, and I personally believe that the government of China should be seeking to support my work, not close it down.

Funding
Over the last year, China Development Brief's English newsletter has recovered approximately 60% of its costs from sale of subscriptions and advertising, and from paid speaking engagements and consultancy work.

Today, the readership profile of our English products remains broadly similar to that given above, at the beginning of our publishing history. However, there has been strong growth of readership among academic institutionsâ€"for example, the libraries of Harvard, Columbia and a dozen other universities provide access to our website among their on-line resources; and many overseas students, including a large number of overseas Chinese, read China Development Brief in pursuit of their studies. Also, our subscribers now include many international corporations such as Adidas, Levi Strauss, Microsoft Nike, etc. Because our total readership has grown substantially, the proportion of government and multilateral agencies in our total readership has shrunk significantly.

The remaining 40% of our income last year derived from donations and small grants. Over the past 12 years, China Development Grant has received modest grant support from the following institutions:

Oxfam Hong Kong
Save the Children UK
The Worldwide Fund for Nature
The Ford Foundation
The Trace Foundation
The Kadoorie Charitable Foundation
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund
The Great Britain-China Centre
The Japan Foundation
ActionAid
The British Council
The Canadian International Development Agency Civil Society Program
The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights Project Fund
The Australian International Development Agency

In addition, in order to generate further income to support our publishing, I have undertaken paid consultancy work for:

The Charities Aid Foundation (UK)
The European Union Beijing Delegation
CARE International
Voluntary Service Overseas
Save the Children UK
The Ford Foundation
The International Fund for Agricultural Development
The United Kingdom Department for International Development
The University of Harvard Centre for Global Equity
JP Morgan Bank
HPBilliton

I have provided unpaid consultancy advice to more global businesses, aid agencies, NGOs and researchers than I could possibly list (an average of at least three per week for the last eight years).

I trust that this will give your leaders a fuller picture of what I have been doing in China, and assist their deliberations.

With best wishes

Nick Young

Thursday, May 24, 2007

Have China Scholars All Been Bought?

Academics who study China, which includes the author, habitually please the Chinese Communist Party, sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously. Our incentives are to conform, and we do so in numerous ways: through the research questions we ask or don’t ask, through the facts we report or ignore, through our use of language, and through what and how we teach.

Foreign academics must cooperate with academics in China to collect data and co-author research. Surveys are conducted in a manner that is acceptable to the Party, and their content is limited to politically acceptable questions. For academics in China, such choices come naturally. The Western side plays along.

China researchers are equally constrained in their solo research. Some Western China scholars have relatives in China. Others own apartments there. Those China scholars whose mother tongue is not Chinese have studied the language for years and have built their careers on this large and nontransferable investment. We benefit from our connections in China to obtain information and insights, and we protect these connections. Everybody is happy, Western readers for the up-to-date view from academia, we ourselves for prospering in our jobs, and the Party for getting us to do its advertising. China is fairly unique in that the incentives for academics all go one way: One does not upset the Party.

What happens when we don’t play along is all too obvious. We can’t attract Chinese collaborators. When we poke around in China to do research we run into trouble. Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong and a U.S. citizen, spent five months in a Chinese jail on charges of “endangering state security.” In his own words, his crimes were his critical views of China’s political system, his visits to Taiwan, his use of Taiwanese funds to conduct research on politically sensitive issues, and his collecting research data in China. City University offered no support, and once he was released he went to teach at Old Dominion University in Virginia. One may wonder what five months in the hands of Chinese secret police does to one’s psyche, and what means the Party used to silence Mr. Li. To academics in Hong Kong, the signal was not lost.


China researchers across different disciplines may not all be equally affected. Economists and political scientists are likely to come up against the Party constraint frequently, and perhaps severely. But even sociologists or ethnographers can reach the forbidden zone when doing network studies or examining ethnic minority cultures.

Our self-censorship takes many forms. We ask Western instead of China-relevant questions. We try to explain the profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by basic economic factors, when it may make more sense to explain it by the quality of enterprise management (hand-picked by the Party’s “Organization Department”), or by the political constraints an enterprise faces, or by the political and bureaucratic channels through which an enterprise interacts with its owners, employees, suppliers and buyers. But how to collect systematic information about the influence of the Party on the operation of a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise, when these are typically matters that nobody in the enterprise will speak about?
We talk about economic institutions and their development over time as if they were institutions in the West. “Price administration” regulations, central and local, abound, giving officials far-reaching powers to interfere in the price-setting process. Yet we accept official statistics that show 90% of all prices, by trading value, to be market-determined. We do not question the meaning of the Chinese word shichang, translated as “market,” but presume it to be the same as in the West.

Similarly, we take at face value China’s Company Law, which makes no mention of the Party, even though the Party is likely to still call the shots in the companies organized under the Company Law. Only if one digs deeper will one find unambiguous evidence: The Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and the Shaanxi government in a joint circular of 2006 explicitly require the Party cell in state-owned enterprises (including “companies”) to participate in all major enterprise decisions; the circular also requests that in all provincial state-owned enterprises the chairman of the board of directors and the Party secretary, in principle, are one and the same person. At the national level, the leadership of the 50 largest central state-owned enterprises—enterprises that invest around the world—is directly appointed by the Politburo. Economists do not ask what it means if the Party center increasingly runs enterprises in the U.S. and Europe.

The governor and Party secretary of China’s central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, writes extensively in Chinese about “comprehensively accelerating central bank work” based on the “three represents” (the Party represents the “advanced productive forces, the advanced Chinese culture and the basic interests of the Chinese people”). He describes the three represents as “guiding macroeconomic policy” in ways that defy any Western concept of logic. And yet we take this person as seriously as if we were dealing with the governor of a Western central bank, as if China’s central bank were truly setting monetary policy, and as if the channels through which monetary policy operates in China and the impact monetary policy has on the economy are the same as in the West.

Are we naïve? Or are we justified in ignoring the central bank governor’s second—or rather, first—life as Party secretary? Are we subconsciously shutting out something that we do not comprehend, or something we do not want to see because it doesn’t fit into our neat, Western economic concepts?

Article after article pores over the potential economic reasons for the increase in income inequality in China. We ignore the fact that of the 3,220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of 100 million yuan ($13 million) or more, 2, 932 are children of high-level cadres. Of the key positions in the five industrial sectors—finance, foreign trade, land development, large-scale engineering and securities—85% to 90% are held by children of high-level cadres.

With the introduction of each new element of reform and transition, cadres enrich themselves: the dual track price system, the nonperforming loans, the asset-stripping of SOEs, the misuse of funds in investment companies and in private pension accounts. The overwhelmingly irregular transformation of rural into urban land may well qualify as “systematic looting” by local “leaders.” Local cadres are heavily invested in the small, unsafe coal mines they are supposed to close, and nobody knows how they obtained their stakes in these operations.

A general dearth of economic information shapes our research. Statistics on specific current issues are collected by the National Bureau of Statistics on special request of the Party Central Committee and the State Council. None of this information is likely to be available to the public. The quality of the statistics that are published comes with a large question mark. Outside the realm of official statistics, government departments at all levels collect and control internal information. What is published tends to be propaganda—pieces of information released with an ulterior objective in mind. One solution for China economists then is to resign themselves to conducting sterilized surveys and to building abstract models on the basis of convenient assumptions—of perfect competition, profit maximization given a production technology, household utility maximization with respect to consumption and subject to financial constraints, etc. How much this can tell us about China is unclear.

Other China economists openly accept favors from the Party. We can use our connections to link up with government cadres. We may be hosted in field research by local governments and local Party committees. A local Party committee, at one point, helped me out by providing a car, a Party cadre and a local government official. They directed me to enterprise managers who, presumably, gave all the right answers. The hosts were invariably highly supportive, but I ended up working in exactly the box in which they were thinking and operating. (This seems to be the only research project that I never completed.) Furthermore, those who go to the field and interview cadres may not only unwillingly become a tool of the Party, but also a tool in departmental infighting.

Our use of language to conform to the image the Party wishes to project is pervasive. Would the description “a secret society characterized by an attitude of popular hostility to law and government” not properly describe the secrecy of the Party’s operations, its supremacy above the law and its total control of government? In Webster’s New World College Dictionary, this is the definition of “mafia.”

We speak of the Chinese “government” without further qualification when more than 95% of the “leadership cadres” are Party members, key decisions are reached by leadership cadres in their function as members of Party work committees, the staff of the government Personnel Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Organization Department, the staff of the Supervision Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Disciplinary Commission, and the staff of the PRC Central Military Commission is usually 100% identical to the staff of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. Does China’s government actually govern China, or is it merely an organ that implements Party decisions? By using the word “government,” is it correct to grant the Chinese “government” this association with other, in particular Western, governments, or would it not be more accurate to call it the “government with Chinese characteristics” or the “mafia’s front man”? Who questions the legitimacy of the Party leadership to rule China, and to rule it the way it does?
The Party’s—or, the mafia’s—terminology pervades our writing and teaching. We do not ask if the Chinese Communist Party is communist, the People’s Congresses are congresses of the people, the People’s Liberation Army is liberating or suppressing the people, or if the judges are not all appointed by the Party and answer to the Party. We say “Tiananmen incident,” in conformance with Party terminology, but called it “Tiananmen massacre” right after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, when “incident” would have made us look too submissive to the Party.

Which Western textbook on China’s political system elaborates on the Party’s selection and de facto appointment of government officials and parliamentary delegates, and, furthermore, points out these procedures as different from how we view political parties, government and parliament in the West? By following the Party’s lead in giving the names of Western institutions to fake Chinese imitations, we sanctify the Party’s pretenses. We are not even willing to call China what its own constitution calls it: a dictatorship (a “people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat”).

Who lays out the systematic sale of leadership positions across Chinese governments and Party committees? The Heilongjiang scandal provides the going price list from the province down to the county level, a list not to be found in any textbook. The publicly known scope of the sale of positions does not leave much room for interpretation. For these salesmen and saleswomen of government positions to have nothing to fear, the rule of the mafia and its code of silence must be powerful beyond imagination.

What is not normal is accepted as normal for China. Hackers were collecting the incoming emails of a faculty member of the University of Hong Kong from the university’s server until they were found out in June 2005, when they accidentally deleted emails. The hackers came from three mainland Internet provider addresses, and all three IP addresses are state telecommunications firms. Within China, the staff of the foreign students’ dormitories includes public security officials who keep tabs on foreign students and compile each student’s file. In a Shanghai institution of tertiary education, typing “Jiang Zemin” into a search engine from a computer located on campus, three times in a row, leads to the automatic shutdown of access to that search engine for the whole campus. The Party is rumored to employ tens of thousands of Internet “police.” Phone calls are listened to, if not systematically recorded. Emails are filtered and sometimes not delivered. Who will not learn to instinctively avoid what the Party does not want them to think or do?

Party propaganda has found its way deeply into our thinking. The importance of “social stability” and nowadays a “harmonious society” are accepted unconditionally as important for China. But is a country with more than 200 incidents of social unrest every day really socially stable, and its society harmonious? Or does “socially stable” mean no more than acceptance of the rule of the mafia?

“Local government bad, central government good” is another propaganda truism that is accepted unquestioningly in the foreign research community, informing and shaping research questions. Yet, viewing the Party as a mafia, there is no room for such niceties, and reporting outside academia indeed suggests that the center hides a rather hideous second face, and inevitably does so for a purpose.

We see the “ends”—successful reform—and don’t question the “means.” The Party’s growth mantra is faithfully accepted as the overarching objective for the country and the one measure of successful reform. Nobody lingers on the political mechanisms through which growth is achieved. The mafia runs China rather efficiently, so why worry about how it is done, and what the “side effects” are? We obviously know of the labor camps into which people disappear without judiciary review, of torture inflicted by the personnel of state “security” organs, and of the treatment of Falun Gong, but choose to move on with our sterilized research and teaching. We ignore that China’s political system is responsible for 30 million dead from starvation in the Great Leap Forward, and 750,000 to 1.5 million murders during the Cultural Revolution. What can make Western academics stop and think twice about who they have bedded down with?

If academics don’t, who will? The World Bank and other international organizations won’t because they profit from dealing with China. Their banking relationship depends on amicable cooperation with the Party, and a de facto requirement of their research collaboration is that the final report and the public statements are acceptable to Party censors. The research departments of Western investment banks won’t because the banks’ other arms likely depend on business with China.

Does this all matter? Does it matter if China researchers ignore the political context in which they operate and the political constraints that shape their work? Does it matter if we present China to the West the way the Party leadership must like us to present China, providing narrow answers to our self-censored research questions and offering a sanitized picture of China’s political system?

The size of China’s economy will exceed that of the U.S., in purchasing power terms, by 2008 or 2009. China is a country with which Western economies are increasingly intertwined: A quarter of Chinese industry is foreign-owned and we depend on Chinese industry for cheap consumer goods. Ultimately, our pensions, invested in multinationals that increasingly produce in China, depend on the continued economic rise of China. But does the West understand that country and its rulers? At what point, and through what channels, will the Party leadership with its different views of human rights and the citizens’ rights affect our choices of political organization and political freedoms in the West (as it has affected academic research and teaching)? And to what extent are China researchers guilty of putting their own rice bowl before honest thinking and teaching?

April 2007
by Carsten A. Holz
Far Eastern Economic Review

Mr. Holz is an economist and professor in the social science division of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

从事中国研究的学者都被收买了吗?

从事中国研究的学术界人士,包括本文作者自己,习惯性地讨好中共,有时自己明确意识到了,有时没有意识到。这么做的动机是为了适应生存环境,我们通过以下方式讨好中共:提出某些研究课题或者不提出某些研究课题,报告某些事实或者忽略某些事实,我们使用的语言,我们讲授什么以及如何讲授。

外国研究人员必须要和中国研究人员合作,以便搜集数据,合写研究论文。调查要以中共接受的方式进行,调查内容限制在政治上可以被中共接受的范围里。对中国研究人员来说,这种选择是与生俱来的。西方研究人员跟从这种选择。

中国研究人员在独自进行学术研究时也要面对同样的限制。一些西方的中国研究学者在中国有亲属。另外一些人在中国有公寓。那些母语不是汉语的中国研究学者,已经投入多年时间学习语言,把自己的事业建立在这一巨大而无法转移的投入之上。通过与中国的关系,我们获取信息和观点,从中得到利益,因而我们保护这种关系。如此一来,每个人都满意,西方读者得到学术界的最新观点,我们自己得到工作上的成功,中共得到我们为他们提供的广告宣传。中国是唯一的,全体知识界都选择了同一条路:那就是不要让中共不高兴。

如果我们不合作,很明显后果会是什么。我们没法找到中国的合作伙伴。当在中国做研究的时候,我们就遇到麻烦了。李少民是香港城市大学市场系副教授(Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong),美国公民,他在中国监狱里被关了5个月,罪名是“危害国家安全”。按李少民自己的解释,他的罪过包括对中国的政治制度持批评态度,访问台湾,得到来自台湾的经费进行敏感政治题目的研究,在中国收集研究数据。香港城市大学没有对李少民提供任何支持,获得自由之后,他马上离开那里,来到美国弗吉尼亚Old Dominion大学任教(Old Dominion University in Virginia)。人们会猜测落在中共秘密警察手里5个月对人的心理会有什么影响,中共到底用了什么手段来让李少民保持沉默。对香港知识界来说,这个信号被清楚的接收到了。

不同学科从事中国研究的学者并不是都受到同等的影响。经济学家和政治学家比较容易频繁挑战中共的禁忌,有时还很激烈。但甚至社会学家和人种学家也会在进行网络研究或少数族裔文化研究的时候涉足禁区。

我们的自我审查(self-censorship)有多种形式。我们提出和西方有关的问题,而回避和中国有关的问题。我们努力用基本的经济学指标来解释国有企业的利润,而实际上从其它角度分析可能更说明问题,比如从企业管理质量(由中共组织部任命管理层),或者企业和所有者、雇员、供应商以及顾客打交道所凭借的政治关系。但是如何能收集到反映中共对国有或政府控制的企业的影响的系统化信息呢?企业里根本没人愿意谈论这类事情。

我们谈论中国的经济单位及其发展,好像谈论西方的经济单位一样。中央和地方大量“价格管制”的规章,给了官员们极大的权力来干预价格制定的过程。但是我们接收官方公布的数字,上面说90%的商品的交易价格是市场决定的。我们不对中文词“市场”(shichang)的定义表示疑问,而把它直接翻译成“市场”(market),假设它的意思和西方的market是一样的。

与此类似,我们接受中国的公司法(Company Law)表面宣称的、没有提及中国共产党的字面意思,尽管有了公司法,中共仍然会对公司发号施令。只有深入了解,人们才会发现不容置疑的证据:中共陕西省委和陕西省政府在2006年发出联合指示,明确要求国有企业(包括公司,companies)的党支部参与一切企业决策,这个指示还要求全省所有国有企业,董事会主席和党支部书记原则上应该是同一个人。在国家一层,最大的50家中央控制的国有企业,这些在世界各地投资的国有企业,它们的最高管理人由中共政治局直接任命。经济学家不去问问:如果美国或者欧洲的执政党中央不断增加对企业的参与,会意味著什么?

中国中央银行行长兼党委书记周小川,写了大量关于用“三个代表”“全面促进中央银行工作”的中文文章。他用完全违背西方的逻辑概念的方式,论述三个代表是“宏观经济的指导原则”。但是我们以对待西方中央银行行长的认真态度对待这个人,好像中国的中央银行真的制定货币政策,好像中国的货币政策的操作渠道,以及对经济的影响,和西方一样。

我们很幼稚吗?或者我们忽略中央银行行长的第二身份--或者第一身份--中共党委书记,是合适的?我们下意识的回避了某些我们不理解的事情?或者我们只是因为它们不符合西方经济学概念而假装看不见?

连篇累牍的文章探讨中国收入分化日渐增加的原因。我们忽略了这样一个事实:中国拥有一亿元(1千3百万美元)或更多个人财产的3,220个人里,2,932人是中共高干的子女。五个最重要的工业领域,金融,外贸,地产开发,大型工程和安全,85%到90%的核心职位控制在中共高干子女手里。

每次改革或调整的项目出台,高干都从中自肥:价格双轨体系,贷款黑洞,国有企业财产剥离,投资公司资金和私人养老资金的滥用。不合规则的农村土地并入城市应该可以被定义为地方官僚发动的“有系统的抢劫”。地方高官有大笔投资在安全没有保证的小煤矿,这些小煤矿理论上说应该关闭,但是没人知道为什么它们依然在运转。

经济信息的普遍匮乏决定了我们的研究。当前特定课题的统计数字,都是国家统计局按照中共中央委员会和国务院的特定指示收集的。这类信息基本不会公布。而那些公布的信息的质量都要打个大问号。官方统计数字之外,各级政府部门都收集并控制内部信息。公布的信息一般往往是宣传,出于某种隐秘的动机才加以发布。研究中国经济的经济学家采取的一个办法是,放弃进行精确的调查,而是在方便的假设基础上建立抽象的经济学模型:假设有完美的竞争,新技术带来最大利润,消费和金融限制之下的家计效用最大化(household utility maximization),等等。这种办法能在多大程度上反映真实的中国还很难说。

其他研究中国经济的人公开接受中共的青睐。我们可以运用关系联络政府高官。在做实地考察的时候我们会得到地方政府和地方党委的接待,有一次,他们给我提供了一辆车,一名高官和一个地方官。他们给我介绍了一个企业主管,可以想象,他的答案都是没有任何问题的。陪同人员毫无例外都很支持,但我最终完全在他们设计的盒子里工作(这大概是我唯一没有完成的研究项目)。更有甚者,那些采访官员的人可能不仅是无意中作了中共的工具,而且可能作了政府内斗的工具。

我们大量使用符合中共自我包装的形象的语言。难道“对法律和政府充满敌意的秘密社团”,不是对中共行动的隐秘性和置于法律之上的统治方式的准确描述吗?在Webster“新世界大学字典上”(Webster’s New World College Dictionary),这是“黑手党”(mafia)的定义。

我们使用中国“政府”这个名词,却不进一步说明95%的“政府高官”是中共党员,关键决策是这些人在党务工作会议上决定的,政府人事部和党委组织部实际上是同一套人员,监察部和中共纪律委员会实际上是同一套人员,中华人民共和国中央军事委员会和中国共产党中央军事委员会是100%同一套人员。中国政府是在管理中国?还是仅仅作为中共的一个器官执行中共的决定?通过使用“政府”这个词,让中国“政府”等同于其他政府、特别是西方政府是正确的做法吗?把它称为“有中国特色的政府”甚至“黑手党的前台代表”,是不是更加准确呢?谁质疑中共统治中国的合法性,以及中共的统治方式呢?

中共的--或者说黑手党的--名词充满我们的写作和授课。我们不去问中国共产党是不是共产主义者,人民代表大会是不是代表人民,人民解放军是解放还是压迫人民,或者法官们是不是都由中共任命并且服从中共。我们说“天安门事件”,与中共的语言相一致,而在1989年天安门大屠杀刚发生后,我们称之为“天安门大屠杀”,那时用“事件”来称呼让我们显得对中共太顺从。

Monday, May 21, 2007

Zeng - TIME Most Influential person but unknown in China

I was completely moved by Zeng Jinyan and Hujia's stories when I first time heard from a friend. But, as usual there is no way to find further info from Chinese media.

Last a couple of weeks, some foreign medias started talking there were four Chinese people in “TIME 100 the most Influential People in the World”, but in China the newspaper, website have been just highlight Hu, Liu and Ma but absolutely ignored existent of Zeng Jinyan, 22 years old Chinese girl who live in Beijing, well know in the world community. And, still the largest part of general population in China doesn’t know Zeng Jinyan, the annual world’s most influential people choiced by TIME.


Yesterday, I was chosen as one of Time magazine’s “world’s 100 most influential people” in the “heroes and pioneers” category. Congratulations, interviews, phone calls and e-mails aplenty. I was actually quite surprised. To deal with all the questions, I’ve made up a simple summary of all my answers, as thanks for all concerned friends.

昨天,就我入选美国《时代》周刊”全球最具影响力100 人”之”英雄与先驱”(以下简称100人)一事,祝贺、采访和约稿的电话、电邮很多,反而让我觉得意外。面对这些问题,我简单归纳了回答,以答谢关注的朋友。

Q: How did you feel when you learned you’d been selected as one of Time’s ‘100′?
A: Yesterday morning, a Mr. Cai was the first to tell me, over e-mail, that Time had released its 100 list and I was on it.

Time reporters and photographers began to get in touch with me in fall last year. At the time they didn’t say exactly for what the interview and photos would be used. So yesterday when I was able to confirm that my name was on Time’s 100 list, I was quite happy. When the journalist phoned last year for an interview, I was a bit surprised. Whether you’re looking worldwide, in China, or even here in Beijing where we live, there’s way too many people far more influential than I am. I’m quite young, just doing work which to a large extent is not paid any attention by mainstream Chinese society, but I’m also the wife of an illegally monitored “activist” who’s often kidnapped or disappeared by police. My name’s been blocked from all mainland media—in brief, a tather particular role in society, but not one that I thought would make me one of the 100.

But no matter what, I see this as Time giving me some encouragement, an affirmation of the work I did in 2006. I sent a text message to my parents and grandparents way off in Fujian province to let them know, and phoned Hu Jia’s mother to let her know.

May 4, this day is Chen Guangcheng’s son Kerui’s fourth birthday. I’ve been keeping it in mind all along, and this morning when I woke up I got Hu Jia to send [Chen Guangcheng’s wife] Yuan Weijing a short message to congratulate the kid. In my mind, this day belongs to little Kerui. I had to get on the road, so I just hastily posted news about the 100 list up on my blog, and we stuck to our original plan to head out to Miyun Reservoir for a party with some friends, and also because of some other things, we didn’t get home until close to one a.m. and have only been able to reply now.

问:得知自己名列《时代》100人,有什么感受?
答:昨天早上,蔡先生通过电子邮件第一个告诉我《时代》公布的100 人里有我。

《时代》的记者和摄影师去年秋天开始和我联系,当时没有明确说明采访和拍照的目的。所以昨天确定地得知《时代》公布的100 人上有我的名字,我觉得高兴。倒是去年记者电话采访我时,我有点意外。不管是世界范围内,还是在中国国内,哪怕是在我们居住的北京,比我影响力大的人太多了。我年轻,做的是中国主流社会关注程度不高的社会工作,又是一个被警察经常绑架失踪、非法监禁的”活跃分子”的妻子,我的名字还被大陆的各个媒体封杀 ——总之社会角色很特殊,我没有想过自己会成为100 人之一。

无论如何,我觉得这是《时代》给我的一种鼓励,是对我2006 年的工作的肯定。我发手机短信把这条消息告诉我远在福建的父母、干爸干妈,又打电话给胡佳的母亲。

5 月4日 这一天是陈光诚的儿子克睿的4岁生日,之前我一直惦记着,早晨醒来我就让胡佳先给袁伟静发短消息祝福小孩子,在我心中这一天是属于小克睿的节日。因为要赶路,所以匆匆通过电子邮件把关于 100人的消息发到博客,我们按原计划出发到密云水库和朋友聚会,又因为其他一些事情,到夜里近一点才回到家,所以今天才回应。

Q: What do you think the reasons were why you were included in the 100?
A: I’m not sure what standards Time uses in selecting the 100, I can only guess.

My use of blogging could be one reason why I was selected. In this country we have no freedom of speech, the media are first and foremost “the Party’s mouthpiece”, and journalists and media’s right to continued existence lies in the hands of the Central Propaganda Department. Even if top-notch media workers can still sometimes break through news censorship, they’ve still no chance for long-term investigative reporting into the incidents and problems of society’s lower levels’ most in need of attention. After personally interacting with weaker groups in society, personally investigating some related social problems, and as I began reading some credible English-language reports and academic studies, I finally understood that we Chinese citizens live in a society of lies, that just like the Central Propaganda Department is just like the Ministry of Truth in “1984″, using its own language each day to “change history”, “rewrite the truth”. As well as ordering Chinese news outlets to produce “deeply-moving, positive and helpful news reports”. In a rejection of fake news, fake renditions of the truth, more and more Chinese are opening their own independent news outlets online—blogs, which even if they don’t report on major national incidents, they can still record the hundreds of different nuances to society that they see around them, even if it just a few casual “sincere” lines on their blog. In real life, people are worried about creating trouble and so tend to be rather unresponsive to political problems. But when anonymous on the internet, you can see the countless and passionate opinions strongly concerned with Chinese society, netizens tearing away at current events. And as mainstream media are unable to report on such important events and topics as illegal house arrests, forced disappearances and the civil rights and civil society movements, blogs have become a platform and a chance through which social works and independent thinkers can interact with the public. In 2006 when I opened a blog to continue writing about Hu Jia’s disappearance and long-term house arrest and my own life of being followed, as well as the stories of those with similar experiences in China, it attracted many people’s attention. Especially while Hu Jia had disappeared, my blog came to act as a rescue center, things I’d never before imagined possible. Blogs have become a tool for those in the civil rights movement, those in citizen social work, and even as a way to protect family members, and as long as people record truthful portrayals of what they encounter, it’s guaranteed that their blog content will stand out from others. The only pity is that since September 9, 2006, my blog has been blocked by police and cannot be directly viewed from within China. Even my own blog I often am able only to update it via e-mail.

There’s so many outstanding bloggers in China, be they of literary talent or depth, there’s no way I can be considered the best. That’s why blogging can’t be the only reason for my having been entered. Because incidents of illegal arrest and disappearing in China continue to increase? Because in my process of writing I make use of the impact human rights education and social work have had on me? Because people in China, even the world, pay close attention to the civil rights movment and resistances and struggles of ‘weak groups’ and lower-class citizens? Because in 2006 I wrote too many reports and letters requesting assistance to the United Nations, human rights groups, AIDS workers and environmentalists, the European Union and others with real influence, calling for too many people to join me in writing letters to Chinese leaders? Because after Hu Jia disappeared I successfully held a press conference for foreign correspondents stationed in Beijing, allowing media friends to spread my appeals to the world?

Some people say it’s to do with my bravery. I’m ashamed. Nobody knows how fearful I used to be, or how forebearing I was. In 2004 when Hu Jia first began to disappear or be placed under house arrest, I’d go searching for him, but mostly just waited for him to come back from the police. When the secret police found out where I went to university, they went through the campus Party Committee to tell me “not to continue associating with Hu Jia”, “stop wasting time on AIDS social work”, or else “start worrying about your diploma”, I was often so scared that I’d just stay quiet. Really. In 2006 between the disappearances and the house arrests, I began to learn how to fight back, and gradually stopped being so scared. Because I’d finally realized that if I can’t even protect the people I love the most, what else do I have to lose? What else am I scared of? If people can’t live with dignity, what use is there in suffering in silence? If I live in constant fear of unseen dark forces from the powerful regime and my work is thwarted, then what are the seniors, children, patients and volunteers in the AIDS villages supposed to do? Those family members of rights upholders who’ve had to deal with so much more trouble than I have, like Chen Guangcheng’s wife and son, what are they to do? I believe that as long as justice exists in our hearts, bravery follows in suit. My religious faith has also given me great support, helping me escape from fear. The smiles of my buddhist master and Buddha himself often appear in my mind, renewing my energy. Buddha says all life must deal with so some sort of pain, so I say bring it on! I gradually release my fear, but even if I’m often furious, annoyed or hurt, I still have never lost my faith.

问:你认为什么原因使你能够名列 100人?
答:我不清楚《时代》用什么准则和标准来挑选这 100人,只能做些猜想。

博客的运用可能是我入选的其中一个原因。在我们这个没有言论自由的国家,新闻媒体首先是”党的喉舌”,记者和媒体的”生杀大权”都被中宣部掌控。纵使优秀的媒体工作者能偶尔突破新闻审查,也无法长期全面深入地报道社会底层最需要关注的事件和问题。在亲身接触社会弱势群体,亲自调查一些相关的社会问题,在开始阅读具有公信力的英文报道和学术报告后,我才明白,我们中国公民生活在一个谎言社会里,中宣传部就是《 1984》” 真理部”,每日用它的语言”修改历史”、”编写事实”。并指导、命令国内新闻机构作”感人至深的正面有益的新闻报道”。为了拒绝虚假的新闻,描述真相,越来越多的中国人,在网络开办自己独立的新闻机构——博客,就算不报道国家大事,也可以如实地记叙身边的社会百态,甚至只是在博客上说些”真心”的闲话。在现实生活中,人们因为担心惹麻烦对政治性话题很冷感。在可以匿名的网络上,你会发现无数热情关注中国社会现状、抨击时政的网民。而对于主流媒体不能报道的非法软禁、逼迫失踪、维权以及公民社会运动的重要事件等话题,博客成为社会工作者、有独立思想人士的一个平台和接触公众的机会。 2006年我通过博客持续讲述胡佳的失踪、长期软禁和我被跟踪的生活,以及中国类似遭遇者的故事,引起很多朋友的关注。尤其是胡佳失踪时,博客成为一个营救平台,发挥了我事先未曾想到的作用。博客成为维权运动、公民社会工作、甚至保护家人的一个很好的工具,而只要是记录个案描写个人的真实遭遇,就注定了博客内容与众不同。唯一遗憾的是, 2006年 9月份前后,我的博客被网络警察屏蔽后,在中国大陆就再也无法直接访问了。我连自己更新博客都常常要借助电子邮件。

中国优秀的博客作者众多,无论文采、深度,我都不能算是最好的。所以写博客这一形式肯定不是入选的唯一因素。因为中国的非法拘禁、失踪事件越来越多?因为我在写博客的过程中,实践着人权教育和社会工作对我的影响?因为中国乃至世界的人民非常关注中国维权运动与弱势群体和底层人民的反抗、挣扎?因为2006 年我给联合国机构、人权组织、艾滋病和环保人士、欧盟等真正有影响力的人写了太多的报告和求助信,还号召太多的人和我一起给中国的领导人写信?因为胡佳失踪时我成功地召开了世界各国驻北京记者的招待会,让媒体朋友把我的请求传遍世界?

有些人说是因为我的勇气。我很惭愧。大家不知道我以前是多么地恐惧,又是如何地隐忍。胡佳从2004 年开始就频繁地失踪或被软禁,我寻找过他,但更多地只是等待他从警察手里回来。当国保警察找到我的大学,通过学校党委要求我”不要和胡佳继续交往”、”不要花时间在艾滋病社会工作上”,否则”小心毕业证书”时,我是多么害怕以至于常常沉默。是的,06 年的失踪和软禁事件中我开始学着反抗后,渐渐地不再恐惧了。因为我终于意识到,如果最心爱的人我都不能守护,我还有什么可以失去呢?我还害怕什么呢?如果人不能有尊严地活着,苟且隐忍又有什么意义呢?如果我总是害怕来自政权强大的看不见的黑势力,那我的工作受阻,在艾滋病村的老人、小孩、病人还有志愿者又怎么办呢?那些比我遭受更多磨难的维权人士的家属,如陈光诚的妻儿怎么办呢?相信只要心中存有正义,勇气自然而来。我的宗教信仰也给了我很大的支持,帮助我从恐惧中解脱。根本上师和佛祖的笑颜常常突然出现在我脑海中,让我充满力量。佛祖说人生终归会受各种各样的苦,那就坦然面对吧!于是我渐渐地放下恐惧,纵然时常气愤、恼怒、悲痛,但从来不失去信心。

Q: What sort of influence or changes will the list bring to you?
A: If it hadn’t been for all the friends and journalists sending me congratulations and questions, I wouldn’t even have noticed. Time is one of the world’s most influential media, so releasing this list will of course allow many people to know who these 100 are. But this can only represent a confirmation of work and contributions of the past, people will quickly forget and go look at the next new list, new incidents. This is why I never realized or thought that the being on the 100 list might bring me any effect or change. For the future I’m going going to stick with my social work; my methods won’t change because of this. Temporary international renown might make me feel safer, especially now that I’m pregnant. I think in 2007 or 2008 they might keep following me, keeping me under house arrest, but they won’t go so far as to throw me in jail. But then who knows what might actually end up happening? The friend we’re most concerned about, blind barefoot doctor Chen Guangcheng, was also chosen by Time as one of their 100 heroes and pioneers, which brought him a high degree of attention from world media, the political world and civilians, but as a retaliation for the outstanding civil rights work he did, until today he’s still in prison.

Then some friends told us that yesterday when they phoned us at home or to my cell, they got messages saying the number was out of service or had been disconnected, to try again, and even a busy signal. I definitely did use the phone a few times, but even when I wasn’t it still appeared busy. Then it got worse, as mainland papers went covering the land and sky with news that Hu Jintao and Liu Qi had made the 100, but there were no mentions of me. I was prepared for something like this, so at first I didn’t want to say anything. Who knew people would start phoning me at home to find out why. What could I do? If I didn’t explain it would have seemed like I was lying, but to explain in detail would just hurt my family. Some netizens got confused too, asking: “are mainland media being censored or are foreign media spreading lies?”

问:名列100人会给你将来带来什么影响和改变?
答:如果不是那么多朋友和记者的祝贺与提问,我意识不到这个问题。《时代》是具有世界影响力的媒体,发布名单肯定会让更多人知道这100 人。但是这只能代表着对过去工作和贡献的肯定,很快人们就会忘了,而去看新的名单、新的事件。所以我没有意识到也没有想过名列100 人会给我的将来带来什么影响和改变。将来要做的社会工作照做,方式也不会因此而改变。一时的国际知名度可能会让我更加安全,再加上我现在怀孩子,我想07 、08年他们也许会跟踪、软禁我,但不至于把我投到监狱。可是谁知道究竟会发生什么事情呢?我们最关心的朋友,盲人赤脚律师陈光诚,去年也是《时代》 100人的英雄与先驱,受到世界媒体、政界、民间的高度关注,但是他因出色的维权工作遭到报复,至今还在监狱中。

倒是一些朋友告诉我们,当他们昨天拨打我家的电话和我的手机时,听到的答复是电话有故障或无此号码、请查实,甚至手机显示正在忙——有时我确实在接电话,有时我根本没有使用手机时它也显示忙音。后来更麻烦,因为国内的报纸在铺天盖地地报道胡锦涛和刘淇入选100 人,没有关于我的介绍,对此我早有思想准备,所以原本不想说什么,谁知家里来电话追问为什么。我怎么办呢,不解释似乎我在撒谎,详细解释原因岂不是叫家人伤心!一些网友也迷惑,问”是国内媒体封锁还是国外媒体造谣”?

Q: How do you feel about being listed alongside Chairman Hu Jintao?
A: No special feeling. Our roles in society are too different. China has the highest population in the world, our economy ranks in the top few places, our system’s authority overrules our laws, the Party is bigger than the state. As the representative of a large country under this kind of system, Chairman Hu Jintao undoubtedly has greater influence. Time must have its own factors to consider in compiling the list.

Hu Jia and I are just average people, I work in a small company to make some money to feed the family, doing AIDS care, relief and rights protection work in my free time. Hu Jia is self-employed right now, or as the police put it, “urban unemployed.”

I have no special feeling about being listed alongside Hu Jintao, and have no complaints against this particular person. But, Chinese judiciary bodies suppress civil society and those who uphold rights; as Chairman he needs to take responsibility. Sometimes I’ll hope that the “leaders with conscience” within the higher levels of the Chinese government will speed up the push for social and political reforms, and in wiping out corruption, reducing the weight pressing down on the heads of the common people, allowing Chinese society to effectively improve and granting its people freedom and happiness. But, as the government releases increasingly strict internet and news censorship, policies that strike down on the people, the sheer majority of the time I don’t feel disenchanted with the authorities. I believe the future will be better, but that it needs everyone’s effort, struggle and strife, and not just waiting for the rulers’ bestowing of it upon us at some indefinite point in the future.

问:与胡锦涛主席同列一榜,有何特别感想?
答:没有特别的感受,我们的社会角色很不相同。我国是世界人口最多的国家,经济总量排在前几位,而我们体制权大于法,党大于国。胡锦涛主席作为一个大国如此体制下的最高权力代表,毫无疑问有着巨大的影响力。入选《时代》肯定有它考虑的因素。

我和胡佳都是普通人,我在一家小公司做一点工作挣钱养家,剩下的时间做艾滋病关怀、救助和维权工作。胡佳现在是自由职业者,抑或警方所言的”城市无业人员”。

我对与胡锦涛同榜没有特别的感想,对他个人也没有抱怨。但是,中国司法部门对公民社会和维权人士的镇压,作为主席的他需要负责任。偶尔我会希望中国政府高层的”有良知的领导人”加速推动社会政治改革,以消除腐败弊端,减轻压在老百姓头上的重压,让中国社会真正进步,让人民自由而幸福。可是,随着政府出台越来越严厉的对网络和新闻审查、对民间打压的政策,绝大多数时候我不对当局抱幻想。我相信将来会更好,但是必须通过每一个的努力、挣扎和奋斗,而非等待统治者遥遥无期的” 恩赐”。
cite: John Kennedy, Global Voice

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

面对Sex worker

几天前,和一位政府卫生官员讨论项目时,他极为慎重地告诫我们,在任何形式的正式文函里绝对不能出现“性工作者”一词。因为在中国“性工作者”还是应该属于地下,是不合法的。商业性性交易是国家法律明令禁止的行为。所以,如果我们大张旗鼓地谈及“性工作者”,那是与我国政策相悖的。

其实娼妓在中国是最古老的一个职业。建国后,政府在各地采取不同措施,坚决取缔了各地妓院。当年上海市长陈毅还有这样一段话:“妓女是生活在旧社会最底层的受苦人,新中国决不允许卖淫现象继续存在,我们不管有多大困难,也要解放妓女。” 所以,新中国是没有卖淫嫖娼。

但现实中,看看拉萨,看看内地的任何一个城市,我们真可以那么理直气壮地说,中国已取缔了娼妓吗?至于性工作者、艾滋病这些所谓敏感的话题,不说官员多支持你做项目,有个最起码的理解就已经是阿密托佛了。性工作者 Sex Workers,俗称“妓女”、“男妓”、“鸡”、“鸭”、“戏眯”、很多人只是一贯从道德上去简单地谴责他(她)们。而没有真诚去关心他(她)们,也没有想要真的去寻求解决问题(社会)的方法。但你一天不正视SW这一现象,它所引起的问题(社会/医学)将愈加复杂。而西藏,真可以说是四面楚歌。云南 -艾滋病、性工作者、吸毒是很多NGOs和政府的工作重点;四川/新疆在中国同样是艾滋病、性工作者、吸毒等问题最严重的省份;而领帮的尼泊尔/印度也是艾滋病的温床。再加上,通往西藏的交通是越来越发达,在路上的人是越来越多。所以,“拉萨”距“蛰萨”是越来越近了。

卫生部官员不赞成使用“小姐”“性工作者”称谓
廖怀凌 

近日,国务院防治艾滋病工作委员会办公室主任、卫生部副部长王陇德接受记者专访,就一些有关防治艾滋病的敏感话题进行了探讨。

王陇德表示不赞成使用“小姐”、“‘性工作者”’等称呼。前者把一个普通称呼“特殊化”容易引起误会;后者则等于承认了这一“职业”的合法性。“我称之为‘商业性行为人群’,这是一个客观存在、在艾滋病防控中不可忽视的群体。根据一些国家的经验,对这些高危人群的干预措施至少要落实到60%,才能比较有效遏制艾滋病向普通人群的传播。建议疾控人员对志愿者进行培训,通过志愿者去教育特殊人群。”

王陇德说,性传播已经成为我国艾滋病感染的第一因素,以卖血、吸毒为主因的特殊时期已经过去。“我认为,没有明确的吸毒史、不洁献输血史的感染者大多是性途径感染的,只是当事人不愿意承认而已。”

王陇德表示,商业性行为人群、吸毒者、同性恋者、嫖客等都属于高危人群,其中,商业性行为人群包括女性和男性。而我国同性恋人群的特点非常值得注意。同性恋者往往还有自己的家庭,既有同性性关系,又有异性性关系。这给我国艾滋病传播造成了很严重的问题。因为直肠黏膜组织非常容易破损,所以,同性性行为感染的危险度比异性性行为还要大。这种状况在我国艾滋病传播中将会起到推波助澜的作用。
(《环球视野》摘自2006年12月1日 《羊城晚报》)
在深圳警方用游街示众来羞辱性工作者,却产生了适得其反的效果。还因为侵犯了这些性工作者的权利而受到了批评。游街示众在古代常常用作一种惩罚,但时代变了,中国也在进步。

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

怀柔治藏铁腕治疆[转]


共中央涉西藏和新疆的两个决策小组曝光,分别由两名政治局常委担纲。中央西藏工作协调小组由全国政协主席贾庆林担任组长,中央新疆工作协调小组则由中央政法委书记罗干担任组长。

消息人士称,这一人事布局显示中央对敏感的新疆和西藏事务采取的政策不同,新疆事务以铁腕为主,西藏事务则倾向怀柔。

香港《星岛日报》引述消息人士的话说,西藏小组由贾庆林担任组长,公安部长周永康、中央统战部长刘延东等担任副组长;新疆小组则由罗干担任组长。

中央西藏工作协调小组,也称中央对达赖集团斗争协调小组,是中共中央对西藏事务的统筹机构。

官方《人民政协报》早前披露,“中共中央适时调整充实了西藏工作协调小组,加大了领导力度,强化了协调职能。中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席贾庆林亲自担任组长,国务委员、公安部部长周永康,国务委员、国务院秘书长华建敏,全国政协副主席、中央统战部部长刘延东任副组长,成员增加了西藏自治区党委、国家发改委、财政部和国家宗教局的负责同志,协调机制进一步健全。”

这显示该小组成员还包括西藏党委书记张庆黎、国家发改委主任马凯、财政部长金人庆以及国家宗教局局长叶小文。据悉,安徽省委书记、前西藏党委书记郭金龙也是小组成员。

据悉,中央新疆工作协调小组层次也与西藏小组相当,组长由政治局常委、中央政法委书记罗干担任,副组长包括副总理回良玉以及中央政治局委员、新疆党委书记王乐泉等。

消息人士认为,中共中央对这两个小组的人事布局,显示对敏感的新疆和西藏事务采取的态度不同。由于疆独势力多采取暴力等恐怖手段,因此由主管政法的罗干担纲,铁腕打击疆独。

而笃信佛教的藏独势力,较少使用暴力,因此由政协主席贾庆林担纲领导西藏协调小组,再加上公安部长周永康和统战部长刘延东,采取怀柔与铁腕相结合,以怀柔为主。尤其是加上发改委、财政部等高层进入小组,就是要“加强对西藏发展问题的宏观指导和综合协调,加大对其他藏区的关注和支持力度”,以确保西藏经济社会实现跨越式发展,西藏人民生活水平不断提高,来与流亡海外的达赖集团争取民心。因此,中央援藏项目也以改善农牧民生活为重点。

Sunday, April 08, 2007