feel out

拉萨变了
人多了，汽车也多了
繁华了，也更虚无了
拉萨让我这个拉萨人
产生陌生感
让我格格不入

China Shuts Down NGO Newsletter

Really sucks! China just bans most influential NGO & development newsletter from Beijing.

On July 4, Beijing municipal police raided the Beijing office of China Development Brief, an independent publication that has been operating in China since 1996 that reports on social development and civil society in China. Both the English and Chinese versions of the publication have been banned charged with illegal publishing of the Chinese version. Nick Young, the founding editor who contributes regularly to the English edition, has been deemed guilty of conducting “unauthorized surveys” under the 1989 Statistics Law and now faces possible deportation. Over the past 27 years since international NGOs have been operating in China, this is a rare instance of one being shut down.

This is really a discouraging news, and I am so disappointed. Really, no matter where I live China Development Brief always have been very helpful. It is very informative, and always with in-depth studies on issues and problems in the field of development, in particularly development of China. But now, foreign readers as well as general population will lose resource and information!

China Development Brief
Reporting the latest news on China's social development

Below is a statement that Nick Young have sent to the police officer who interviewed him last week.

Dear Policeman Kang,
In order to assist your investigations, I am pleased to supply you with the following background information on what I have been doing in China over the last twelve years. I would ask you to kindly pass this information to your leaders.

Early Years
I established China Development Brief in 1995, when I was living in Yunnan Province, producing the first issue in January 1996. At first it was a print newsletter, published and distributed by a social development research institute at the City University of Hong Kong. At the end of 1997, that institute and I terminated our relationship and I continued to publish and distribute the newsletter through a sole-proprietor business I established for that purpose in Hong Kong.

In the early years, China Development Brief was a specialist, English language newsletter aimed at international organisations providing development assistance to China. At that time, China was receiving more than USD 4 billion each year in government-to-government, multilateral and private aid from overseas. China Development Brief was the only regular and independent publication reporting on how that money was spent. The purpose of the newsletter, as expressed by its mission statement at that time, was "to increase the effectiveness of international aid to China."

For the first 18 months I produced the newsletter single handed. After that, I was joined by a Canadian Chinese volunteer who worked with me full-time for a little more than one year, during which time we also recruited a young Yunnan University graduate to work as an editorial assistant.

Early subscribers to our publication:

Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and UN system agencies (roughly 10% of the total)

The international aid agencies of donor governments, such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan , Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the UK. (roughly 10% of the total)

Private international aid donors and agencies, including grant-making foundations and operational NGOs (roughly 70% of the total) Although the total aid to China provided by these agencies was much less than that of governmental and multilateral agencies, they were relatively numerous and, given their smaller budgets, had fewer resources for networking and background research to inform their programming; therefore, it was natural that they should comprise our most significant readership, and that the publication should concentrate on meeting their information needs

Foreign correspondents and media reporting on China (roughly 5% of the total)

Academic institutions and individual scholars based overseas (roughly 5% of the total)

Middle Years
In the summer of 1999, I relocated from Kunming, Yunnan, to Beijing , and started to develop a small team ofâ€"mainly Chineseâ€"colleagues to expand China Development Brief's publishing activities. In addition to our regular publishing of the English language newsletter, we:

Published an English language Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (1999)

Published an English language Directory of 250 Chinese NGOs (2001)

Created a Chinese language newsletter (from 1999), compiled and written by Chinese staff, to serve as a "capacity building tool" for China's non-profit sector by sharing information about minjian charitable activity to inform social organisations, scholars and government officials. This newsletter has, from its inception, been under Chinese editorial control. (My Chinese is by no means good enough to edit Chinese text so even at the start my role was limited to providing advice and encouragement.) In 2003, this Chinese edition was formally passed to the ownership of a small team of Chinese staff. It and the English language publishing team, which I continue to head, have continued to share office premises, a common brand, and common values, although the ownership, management and financing of the two operations are now separate.

Published a Chinese language Directory of International NGOs Supporting Work in China (2005). The purpose of this venture was to help interested parties in Chinaâ€"including government officialsâ€"to understand the diverse nature, motivations, aims and methods of international NGOs.

Later Years
At the end of 2004, after the separation of the English and Chinese language editions, I re-structured our English language publishing, closing the print magazine and converting to web publishing. (Our material is now posted on a website operated from a UK server, with a monthly newsletter delivered by email.)

At this point, I changed the mission statement of our English publishing, re-articulating it as: "To enhance constructive engagement between China and the world."

This change in publishing method and in mission reflected the changes that had occurred in China and world over the previous decade. The Internet was now used widely (whereas in 1995 when I created the first publication, Yunnan Province was only just beginning to be developed). This greatly increased the amount of information published about China and about the topics that we had been covering.

At the same time, because of the worldwide development of interest in the idea of "corporate social responsibility," many global businesses with operations in China were taking more interest in social issues, and I felt that the publication should no longer have a narrow focus on international "aid," but speak also to a wider range of international entities connected in some ways to China. This was particularly pertinent because, in the light of China's booming economy, many of the Western government donors were beginning to close their aid programs to China.

Meanwhile, and most importantly, after several years in which the West's attention had mainly been focused on the US-led "war on terror," China's peaceful rise was being increasingly noticed and commented upon by Western media, think-tanks and NGOs that did not necessarily have "aid" programs in China.

A great deal of that Western commentary was more or less openly hostile to China, presenting it as a threat to global peace and environmental sustainability and as a place where a cruel, totalitarian government rules over a population who care about nothing except their family's immediate economic interests.

I felt that this was grossly unfair and potentially harmful to the interests of both China and the wider world. It is unfair because, in my view:

Much of the instability in the world still arises from the actions of Western powers (eg, the invasion of Iraq)

A wealthy (and mainly white) minority of the world's population consumes a disproportionately large share of the world's resources and bears the major responsibility for degradation of the global environment

After 150 years of instability and economic blight, China is resuming the place in the world that it fully deserves to occupy and most Chinese people are justly proud of this achievement. I believe that China's senior leadership recognises the need to grow in ways that are environmentally sustainable and socially stable. The international community should recognise, with sympathy and respect, the enormous difficulty of the tasks facing China, rather than simply berating China and encouraging Western populations to fear China.

Mainly, I have been motivated by the fear that, as China continues to grow, Western attitudes towards China may harden, provoking a hardening of Chinese attitudes, and potential trade, diplomatic and even armed conflicts that will serve the interests of precisely no-one.

These views have been consistently apparent in China Development Brief's published editorials over the last two yearsâ€"while our feature articles and news reports have continued to cover a broad range of social issues in ways that seek to represent fairly the government of China's policies and approaches as well as those of international organisations, Chinese scholars, and Chinese non-profit organisations.

A few specific examples will illustrate this editorial approach:

February 2005, Editorial: "China has historically been the subject of more white racism than almost any other country or culture."

March 2005, Editorial criticising Chinese "AIDS activists" in Henan Province: "Now is the time to work with government, not against it."

April 2005, Editorial criticising an irresponsible US State Department grant to a Chinese NGO: "Labour rights groups will stumble if pushed to run too soon."

October 2005, Editorial: "China cannot develop equitably without stable government and leadership; and, apart from the [Communist] Party, there is no other contender for administrative power."

September 2005, Editorial on the impacts of "colour revolutions" on NGO-government relations in China : "International NGOs and foundations . . . should continue to put their case calmly, patiently and, above all, transparently. Their situation is not helped by those in the United States who bray about 'democracy' in ways that inevitably strike much of the world as ideologically imperialist. But this is all the more reason for the NGOs to explain clearly to [the Chinese] government at all levels exactly how they work, and why. And international organisations that are not committed to operating transparently should pack their bags and leave as they have nothing of value to offer the country."

March 2006, Editorial on China's environmental NGOs: "Despite China's security anxieties (heightened by the US State Department's bizarre view of NGOs as a proxy for American interests), green NGOs in China are loyal and patriotic and they still expect and want the government to take a lead."

February 2007, Editorial criticising an Amnesty International report on internal migration in China as being "facile": "This document is not a good starting point for understanding what is going on in China. It shows little or no recognition of the complex forces at work in China's government and society, or of the fact that discrimination against migrants is historically embedded, not just something that 'the government' does to them . . . China's political leaders are not schoolchildren to be ticked off and told to do better; and there are no simple policy switches that can be flicked to make everything alright . . . groups like Amnesty need to learn to treat China with more respect, or they will never be taken seriously here."

April 2007: Editorial on family planning policies argues that these have "played a key role in China's social and economic transformation." It goes on to point out: "Foreigners have generally been quick to deplore the authoritarian nature of the [birth control] policy but slow to acknowledge its role in China's escape from poverty. Even as the world at large grows anxious about China's carbon footprint and the spillage of its population overseas, there is widespread reluctance to acknowledge it might have been a good idea to prevent an extra 800 million Chinese feet from treading on the planet."

In summary, I have constantly striven, as per our mission statement, and for negligible personal gain, to encourage foreigners to approach China constructively, looking for ways to cooperate rather than ways to merely criticise.

In addition to the hundreds of thousands of words I have written in this constructive vein, my views have been sought privately by literally hundreds of international aid agencies, NGOs and businesses. In private as in print, I have repeatedly urged all of them to be transparent about what they do and to work as closely as they can with the Chinese authorities, taking the time and showing the respect that is necessary to develop meaningful relationships.

I have been equally open in my relationships with Chinese organisations, individuals, media and government officials.

Ministry of Civil Affairs and National Peoples Congress professional staff have in the past actively sought my views on the development of charity in China and on the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework.

On many occasions I have been invited to make presentations to conferences convened by Chinese government agencies in cooperation with international organisations such as the European Union and the Asian Development Bank.

I have on several occasions been hired by agencies close to the government of Chinaâ€"such as the China Association for NGOs (CANGOS) and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviationâ€"to provide training services for Chinese NGOs.

I have also provided consultancy, training and conference support services to Chinese government agenciesâ€"such as provincial Environment Protection Bureau, Education Bureau, Women's Federation, Agriculture Bureau and Civil Affairs staffâ€"through arrangement with international organisations funding development programs of various kinds.

I have been quoted many times in Chinese print media, and have been invited on seven or eight occasions to appear as an expert commentator on CCTV English language programs (including one live broadcast).

I have been aware over the last two years that China Development Brief has been watched closely by the Chinese security services. I have been as informative and helpful as I can to them, because I believe it is better to work for mutual understanding than to remain in the dark of mutual suspicion and hostility. I have paid out of my own pocket for meals eaten by people who are vague about their identity but who I believe to be security agentsâ€"supplying them, all the while, with information and analysis.

In short, I consider myself to be a very good friend of China, and I personally believe that the government of China should be seeking to support my work, not close it down.

Funding
Over the last year, China Development Brief's English newsletter has recovered approximately 60% of its costs from sale of subscriptions and advertising, and from paid speaking engagements and consultancy work.

Today, the readership profile of our English products remains broadly similar to that given above, at the beginning of our publishing history. However, there has been strong growth of readership among academic institutionsâ€"for example, the libraries of Harvard, Columbia and a dozen other universities provide access to our website among their on-line resources; and many overseas students, including a large number of overseas Chinese, read China Development Brief in pursuit of their studies. Also, our subscribers now include many international corporations such as Adidas, Levi Strauss, Microsoft Nike, etc. Because our total readership has grown substantially, the proportion of government and multilateral agencies in our total readership has shrunk significantly.

The remaining 40% of our income last year derived from donations and small grants. Over the past 12 years, China Development Grant has received modest grant support from the following institutions:

Oxfam Hong Kong
Save the Children UK
The Worldwide Fund for Nature
The Ford Foundation
The Trace Foundation
The Kadoorie Charitable Foundation
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund
The Great Britain-China Centre
The Japan Foundation
ActionAid
The British Council
The Canadian International Development Agency Civil Society Program
The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights Project Fund
The Australian International Development Agency

In addition, in order to generate further income to support our publishing, I have undertaken paid consultancy work for:

The Charities Aid Foundation (UK)
The European Union Beijing Delegation
CARE International
Voluntary Service Overseas
Save the Children UK
The Ford Foundation
The International Fund for Agricultural Development
The United Kingdom Department for International Development
The University of Harvard Centre for Global Equity
JP Morgan Bank
HPBilliton

I have provided unpaid consultancy advice to more global businesses, aid agencies, NGOs and researchers than I could possibly list (an average of at least three per week for the last eight years).

I trust that this will give your leaders a fuller picture of what I have been doing in China, and assist their deliberations.

With best wishes

Nick Young

Long life of HH

Long Life prayers for

His Holiness the Dalai Lama

kang ri ra we kor we shing kam dir
pen tang de wa ma lu jung we nei
chen re ze wang Tenzin Gyatso yi
shap pe sit e bar du ten gyur chik

In the snowy mountain paradise,
You are the source of all good and happiness.
Powerful Tenzin Gyatso, Chenresig,
May you stay until samsara ends.

日瓦

... it has been so long...
好久没更新博客了
屏闭是一
调整自己是二
三也不知应该写些什么东东

上周“折林吉桑”，代表流亡政府的四位特使与中方开始了第六次“亲密接触”。但看来还是“涛声依旧”无任何实质性内容和结果，郁闷呀。都说希望越大，失望越大；希望越小，失望越少；没有希望，就没有失望；看来我们也应该调整一下对特使的“期望指”。或许某一天，当我们不再寄于任何希望时，或许会有一个意外的惊喜, who knows!

完全同意王老师的观点，这种形式的会谈，不会有我们期待的惊喜。“第一，中方从来说不是和达赖喇嘛的特使进行交往；第二，他们不是讨论西藏问题，只是讨论达赖喇嘛的个人问题。在过去也是这么说的。这种态度是非常不真诚的，也是不尊重对方的。在这样的前提下，怎么想像去获得真正有实质性内容的结果呢？”。

是地球人都明白，如果只是单纯的探亲团，那还需要如此这般的劳师动重吗？

Info 前五次会谈情况的情况如下：

第一次会谈
时间：2002年9月，
地点：北京、拉萨、林芝、日喀则、成都、上海、北京等地。
内容：会见阿沛•阿旺晋美，会晤统战部部长王兆国、副部长李德洙等官员。参观性质，没有实质性会谈。

第二次会谈
时间：2003年 5月底至 6月初
地点：江苏、浙江、云南迪庆藏族自治州等地。
内容：会晤统战部部长刘延东、副部长朱维群等官员。参观性质。仍没有任何实质性会谈。第一、二次被称为“破冰之旅”。

第三次会谈
时间：2004年9月
地点：广东、湖北、四川甘孜藏族自治州等地。
内容：会晤统战部部长刘延东、朱维群和中国民族委员会有关负责人。第三次前往，双方开始讨论一些问题。

第四次会谈
时间：2005年6月底至7月初
地点：中国驻瑞士大使馆
内容：与统战部副部长朱维群、统战部7局（主管西藏事物）局长斯塔举行会谈。另外，达兰萨拉增加一名谈判代表：才嘉，他是达兰萨拉驻台湾机构负责人。

第五次会谈
时间：2006年2月15——2月23日。
地点：广西桂林等地。
内容：与统战部副部长朱维群就实质问题会谈一天。

发生发声 Inside Out

西藏有当代艺术吗？5月26日，在北京聚集了众多当代艺术画廊的798艺术区，甚至连著名艺术评论家、有“中国当代艺术教父”之称的栗宪庭先生，面对七位藏人画家的作品也惊讶了。他后来在跟画家们会面时由衷地说：“原以为西藏还没有当代艺术，看了这个画展，第一个感觉就是：有了！西藏人已经有了自己的当代艺术！”

Ice Buddha by Gadi

除了一位英籍藏人画家，其他几位画家来自拉萨本土、一个名为“更敦群培”的艺术家群体。炎热的内陆气候虽然让高原上的藏人不太适应，但他们非常珍视第一次在北京举办以当代艺术为主题的画展。他们把这次画展命名为“发生发声”，表达了他们渴望用艺术来记录和揭示当今西藏的状态、渴望用艺术来发出当今西藏人的声音。因为他们本身就是生活在21世纪的西藏人，在这个极为动荡的时代，以全球化和汉化为主的多样性从未如此复杂地交织在一起，冲击着早已失去了在自我封闭中保持宁静的雪域高原。

masked man by Nortse

长期以来，外界对西藏艺术的印象，一种是西藏的唐卡绘画、寺院壁画和各种佛像造像等等，属于西藏传统文化中极其灿烂和辉煌的传统艺术，已为举世公认；另一种则是这几十年来，众多外来的艺术家所描绘的他们认为的西藏，不是具有意识形态含义的政治宣传品，就是甜得发腻、美得虚假的人间净土。遗憾的是，这种对西藏的误读，也影响了一批企图摆脱传统形式的西藏本土画家，使得他们的作品没有自己的声音。

当西藏本土画家开始以“发生发声”为宗旨，西藏的当代艺术终于出现在拉萨，也出现在纽约和北京，从此有了属于自己的独特的声音。西藏近代伟大的人文主义者更敦群培的叛逆精神鼓舞着西藏年轻的艺术家们，西藏的当代艺术正在令人期待地发生当中。不过，对于探索和创新中的艺术家来说，并非与传统告别就是当代艺术的标准。栗宪庭先生的这段话无疑值得深思：“当代不仅仅是一种形式，更重要的是观念。一方面，古老的西藏离当代可能有遥远的距离，另一方面，在西藏的传统中也不乏当代的观念。比如藏传佛教中的沙坛城，无论从形式、行为还是观念上都非常当代，超过很多最前卫的艺术。”

untitled by Tsewang Tashi

画家贡嘎嘉措的行为艺术《我的身份》原本由四幅照片组成，是由画家本人模拟四个不同的历史境况下的画家形象。从他的不同装束，以及他所画的佛像、毛泽东像、达赖喇嘛像和抽象的坛城画，展示了一代西藏人的命运轨迹。而在北京的画展上，却少了画家画达赖喇嘛像的照片，原因可想而知。于是在原本应该悬挂那幅照片的墙上，留下了空白。这一缺位和空白，在我的眼里，恰如这个行为艺术的延伸，更真切地揭示了当代西藏的状态。
by Woeser, 2007-6-12

My Identity by Gonkar Gyatso

拉萨市区禁止探矿采矿

今天在新华网上又看到一则关于西藏探矿采矿的消息。

新闻说：为了在日益发展的社会经济活动和城市建设中更好地保护环境，拉萨市政府日前正式颁布通告，全面禁止市区范围内的探矿、采矿活动，同时对采石和采砂活动进行更严格的规范。

拉萨市常务副市长谢延智５日向"中华环保世纪行--西藏行"活动汇报时说，这项举措是拉萨市严格执行环境管理制度、加强污染防治的重要一环。 根据已经正式实施的《拉萨市政府关于在市区禁止探矿采矿、规范采石、采砂的通告》，拉萨市规划控制区内禁止探矿采矿，并整顿规范采石采砂行为；在划定区域内凡符合有关规定要求、手续齐全的采石、采砂场点，要严格按照科学合理开采，不得造成环境破坏和资源浪费。

谢延智说，去年拉萨市对６家选矿厂下达了停建通知书，对１３家采石、采砂和取土厂下发了停业整顿通知书，还处罚了１１家有违法行为的选矿厂。

前段时间拉萨市政府网上还有这么个决策：根据《中华人民共和国环境保护法》、《中华人民共和国矿产资源法》、《西藏自治区环境保护条例》和《拉萨市城市总体规划》等相关法律法规的规定和文件精神，经拉萨市政府2007年3月30日第五次常务会议研究决定在拉萨市区划定探矿、采矿禁采区，并对采石、采砂场点进行规范。并下发了《拉萨市人民政府关于拉萨市区禁止探矿、采矿，规范采石、采砂的通告》、《拉萨市人民政府关于拉萨市区禁止探矿、采矿，规范采石、采砂的决定》，该决定从2007年5月1日起正式实施。

决定把拉萨东起纳金电厂、桑珠林南北线，西至堆龙德庆县东嘎镇、柳梧新区南北线，南至南山山脊分水岭以北，北至北山山脊分水岭以南列入禁采区。决定要求在禁采区内现有探矿、采矿场点在60日内由所在地县级人民政府负责关闭；禁采区内凡符合有关规定要求、手续齐全的采石、采砂场点要严格按照相关规定科学、合理开采，不得造成环境破坏和资源浪费；对拉萨监狱所属西藏桑伊建筑建材开发中心采石场在2008年12月31日前进行关闭；指出自《通告》下发之日起，禁采区内不得审批新的任何形式的探矿、采矿、采石、采砂场点；要求各级监察、环保、国土、工商等行政主管部门要严格执法，认真按照《通告》精神，制定措施，抓好落实，加强拉萨城市景观和生态环境的保护。

虽然乍看还象是个好消息，但问题真这么简单吗？

1. 为什么会有此《通告》？
2. 界定禁采区的依据是什么？
3. 其实现在乱探乱采矿都是在那曲，墨竹和日喀则等地区，而非禁采区。难道又是一个show case?
4. 对那些乱探乱采矿，而又不在禁采区的矿区是如何处理？
5. 说是在禁采区手续齐全的要严格按照相关规定科学、合理开采，不得造成环境破坏和资源浪费，那么又是哪个部门来监督？相关部门是否明白相关规定？
6. 钢筋水泥的拉萨城市景观和生态环境已有太多“聚光灯”的关照了。

Phunwang asks Hu to allow return of HH

Former Tibetan Communist official asks Hu to allow return of the Dalai Lama

A Tibetan Communist who led Chinese advance troops into his homeland decades ago has written to President Hu Jintao of China and condemned hard-liners for continuing their opposition to the exiled Dalai Lama and for blocking his return.
Phuntso Wangye's three letters to Hu have never before been made public and signal a debate in China's senior political echelons on the possible return of the Dalai Lama, who fled to India in 1959 after an abortive uprising in the Himalayan region.

"They make a living, are promoted and become rich by opposing splittism," Phuntso, who spent 18 years in solitary confinement after being purged in the 1950s, wrote in 2004. Reuters obtained copies of the letters from two sources close to Phuntso.

The Dalai Lama has said he wants greater autonomy, not independence, for his predominantly Buddhist homeland. But Chinese and Tibetan leftists, or conservatives, are convinced otherwise and regularly denounce him for trying to split Tibet from the Chinese "motherland."

In a letter written in 2006, Phuntso singled out a retired lieutenant general, Yin Fatang, Tibet's former Communist Party boss, for sticking to "wrong" leftist policies — a rare revelation of the unfading influence of hard-liners.

An aide to Yin turned down an interview request.

"Secretary Yin knows about Phuntso's three letters and has written reports for central departments concerned, but it's inconvenient to make them public," the aide said.

During a meeting with a Reuters correspondent in his Beijing home recently, Phuntso said he sent the letters to Hu through the National People's Congress, of which he was a member.

"I said it all in my letters," the 84- year-old said, declining to comment further to observe party discipline, which bars members from speaking to foreign reporters without approval.

"If the Dalai Lama and the central government reconcile, these people will be in a state of trepidation, feel nervous and could lose their jobs," Phuntso's 2004 letter says.
Phuntso was one of five people who led Chinese advance troops into Tibet's capital, Lhasa, in 1951.

He was the interpreter in negotiations and witnessed the signing of a 17- point agreement on the "peaceful liberation" of his homeland.

When the Dalai Lama met Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1954, Phuntso was the interpreter.

Fine Art

Art by Andy Warhol

Rest by Pablo Picasso

Evening Lounge by Brent Lynch

The Scream by Edvard Munch

The Kiss by Gustav Klimt

Girl with a Pearl Earring by Jan Vermeer

Blue Nude by Pablo Picasso

Pablo Picasso's tragic and poignant "Old Guitarist"

The Café Terrace on the Place du Forum, Arles, at Night, by Vincent van Gogh

Have China Scholars All Been Bought?

Academics who study China, which includes the author, habitually please the Chinese Communist Party, sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously. Our incentives are to conform, and we do so in numerous ways: through the research questions we ask or don’t ask, through the facts we report or ignore, through our use of language, and through what and how we teach.

Foreign academics must cooperate with academics in China to collect data and co-author research. Surveys are conducted in a manner that is acceptable to the Party, and their content is limited to politically acceptable questions. For academics in China, such choices come naturally. The Western side plays along.

China researchers are equally constrained in their solo research. Some Western China scholars have relatives in China. Others own apartments there. Those China scholars whose mother tongue is not Chinese have studied the language for years and have built their careers on this large and nontransferable investment. We benefit from our connections in China to obtain information and insights, and we protect these connections. Everybody is happy, Western readers for the up-to-date view from academia, we ourselves for prospering in our jobs, and the Party for getting us to do its advertising. China is fairly unique in that the incentives for academics all go one way: One does not upset the Party.

What happens when we don’t play along is all too obvious. We can’t attract Chinese collaborators. When we poke around in China to do research we run into trouble. Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong and a U.S. citizen, spent five months in a Chinese jail on charges of “endangering state security.” In his own words, his crimes were his critical views of China’s political system, his visits to Taiwan, his use of Taiwanese funds to conduct research on politically sensitive issues, and his collecting research data in China. City University offered no support, and once he was released he went to teach at Old Dominion University in Virginia. One may wonder what five months in the hands of Chinese secret police does to one’s psyche, and what means the Party used to silence Mr. Li. To academics in Hong Kong, the signal was not lost.

China researchers across different disciplines may not all be equally affected. Economists and political scientists are likely to come up against the Party constraint frequently, and perhaps severely. But even sociologists or ethnographers can reach the forbidden zone when doing network studies or examining ethnic minority cultures.

Our self-censorship takes many forms. We ask Western instead of China-relevant questions. We try to explain the profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by basic economic factors, when it may make more sense to explain it by the quality of enterprise management (hand-picked by the Party’s “Organization Department”), or by the political constraints an enterprise faces, or by the political and bureaucratic channels through which an enterprise interacts with its owners, employees, suppliers and buyers. But how to collect systematic information about the influence of the Party on the operation of a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise, when these are typically matters that nobody in the enterprise will speak about?
We talk about economic institutions and their development over time as if they were institutions in the West. “Price administration” regulations, central and local, abound, giving officials far-reaching powers to interfere in the price-setting process. Yet we accept official statistics that show 90% of all prices, by trading value, to be market-determined. We do not question the meaning of the Chinese word shichang, translated as “market,” but presume it to be the same as in the West.

Similarly, we take at face value China’s Company Law, which makes no mention of the Party, even though the Party is likely to still call the shots in the companies organized under the Company Law. Only if one digs deeper will one find unambiguous evidence: The Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and the Shaanxi government in a joint circular of 2006 explicitly require the Party cell in state-owned enterprises (including “companies”) to participate in all major enterprise decisions; the circular also requests that in all provincial state-owned enterprises the chairman of the board of directors and the Party secretary, in principle, are one and the same person. At the national level, the leadership of the 50 largest central state-owned enterprises—enterprises that invest around the world—is directly appointed by the Politburo. Economists do not ask what it means if the Party center increasingly runs enterprises in the U.S. and Europe.

The governor and Party secretary of China’s central bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, writes extensively in Chinese about “comprehensively accelerating central bank work” based on the “three represents” (the Party represents the “advanced productive forces, the advanced Chinese culture and the basic interests of the Chinese people”). He describes the three represents as “guiding macroeconomic policy” in ways that defy any Western concept of logic. And yet we take this person as seriously as if we were dealing with the governor of a Western central bank, as if China’s central bank were truly setting monetary policy, and as if the channels through which monetary policy operates in China and the impact monetary policy has on the economy are the same as in the West.

Are we naïve? Or are we justified in ignoring the central bank governor’s second—or rather, first—life as Party secretary? Are we subconsciously shutting out something that we do not comprehend, or something we do not want to see because it doesn’t fit into our neat, Western economic concepts?

Article after article pores over the potential economic reasons for the increase in income inequality in China. We ignore the fact that of the 3,220 Chinese citizens with a personal wealth of 100 million yuan ($13 million) or more, 2, 932 are children of high-level cadres. Of the key positions in the five industrial sectors—finance, foreign trade, land development, large-scale engineering and securities—85% to 90% are held by children of high-level cadres.

With the introduction of each new element of reform and transition, cadres enrich themselves: the dual track price system, the nonperforming loans, the asset-stripping of SOEs, the misuse of funds in investment companies and in private pension accounts. The overwhelmingly irregular transformation of rural into urban land may well qualify as “systematic looting” by local “leaders.” Local cadres are heavily invested in the small, unsafe coal mines they are supposed to close, and nobody knows how they obtained their stakes in these operations.

A general dearth of economic information shapes our research. Statistics on specific current issues are collected by the National Bureau of Statistics on special request of the Party Central Committee and the State Council. None of this information is likely to be available to the public. The quality of the statistics that are published comes with a large question mark. Outside the realm of official statistics, government departments at all levels collect and control internal information. What is published tends to be propaganda—pieces of information released with an ulterior objective in mind. One solution for China economists then is to resign themselves to conducting sterilized surveys and to building abstract models on the basis of convenient assumptions—of perfect competition, profit maximization given a production technology, household utility maximization with respect to consumption and subject to financial constraints, etc. How much this can tell us about China is unclear.

Other China economists openly accept favors from the Party. We can use our connections to link up with government cadres. We may be hosted in field research by local governments and local Party committees. A local Party committee, at one point, helped me out by providing a car, a Party cadre and a local government official. They directed me to enterprise managers who, presumably, gave all the right answers. The hosts were invariably highly supportive, but I ended up working in exactly the box in which they were thinking and operating. (This seems to be the only research project that I never completed.) Furthermore, those who go to the field and interview cadres may not only unwillingly become a tool of the Party, but also a tool in departmental infighting.

Our use of language to conform to the image the Party wishes to project is pervasive. Would the description “a secret society characterized by an attitude of popular hostility to law and government” not properly describe the secrecy of the Party’s operations, its supremacy above the law and its total control of government? In Webster’s New World College Dictionary, this is the definition of “mafia.”

We speak of the Chinese “government” without further qualification when more than 95% of the “leadership cadres” are Party members, key decisions are reached by leadership cadres in their function as members of Party work committees, the staff of the government Personnel Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Organization Department, the staff of the Supervision Ministry is virtually identical to the staff of the Party Disciplinary Commission, and the staff of the PRC Central Military Commission is usually 100% identical to the staff of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. Does China’s government actually govern China, or is it merely an organ that implements Party decisions? By using the word “government,” is it correct to grant the Chinese “government” this association with other, in particular Western, governments, or would it not be more accurate to call it the “government with Chinese characteristics” or the “mafia’s front man”? Who questions the legitimacy of the Party leadership to rule China, and to rule it the way it does?
The Party’s—or, the mafia’s—terminology pervades our writing and teaching. We do not ask if the Chinese Communist Party is communist, the People’s Congresses are congresses of the people, the People’s Liberation Army is liberating or suppressing the people, or if the judges are not all appointed by the Party and answer to the Party. We say “Tiananmen incident,” in conformance with Party terminology, but called it “Tiananmen massacre” right after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, when “incident” would have made us look too submissive to the Party.

Which Western textbook on China’s political system elaborates on the Party’s selection and de facto appointment of government officials and parliamentary delegates, and, furthermore, points out these procedures as different from how we view political parties, government and parliament in the West? By following the Party’s lead in giving the names of Western institutions to fake Chinese imitations, we sanctify the Party’s pretenses. We are not even willing to call China what its own constitution calls it: a dictatorship (a “people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat”).

Who lays out the systematic sale of leadership positions across Chinese governments and Party committees? The Heilongjiang scandal provides the going price list from the province down to the county level, a list not to be found in any textbook. The publicly known scope of the sale of positions does not leave much room for interpretation. For these salesmen and saleswomen of government positions to have nothing to fear, the rule of the mafia and its code of silence must be powerful beyond imagination.

What is not normal is accepted as normal for China. Hackers were collecting the incoming emails of a faculty member of the University of Hong Kong from the university’s server until they were found out in June 2005, when they accidentally deleted emails. The hackers came from three mainland Internet provider addresses, and all three IP addresses are state telecommunications firms. Within China, the staff of the foreign students’ dormitories includes public security officials who keep tabs on foreign students and compile each student’s file. In a Shanghai institution of tertiary education, typing “Jiang Zemin” into a search engine from a computer located on campus, three times in a row, leads to the automatic shutdown of access to that search engine for the whole campus. The Party is rumored to employ tens of thousands of Internet “police.” Phone calls are listened to, if not systematically recorded. Emails are filtered and sometimes not delivered. Who will not learn to instinctively avoid what the Party does not want them to think or do?

Party propaganda has found its way deeply into our thinking. The importance of “social stability” and nowadays a “harmonious society” are accepted unconditionally as important for China. But is a country with more than 200 incidents of social unrest every day really socially stable, and its society harmonious? Or does “socially stable” mean no more than acceptance of the rule of the mafia?

“Local government bad, central government good” is another propaganda truism that is accepted unquestioningly in the foreign research community, informing and shaping research questions. Yet, viewing the Party as a mafia, there is no room for such niceties, and reporting outside academia indeed suggests that the center hides a rather hideous second face, and inevitably does so for a purpose.

We see the “ends”—successful reform—and don’t question the “means.” The Party’s growth mantra is faithfully accepted as the overarching objective for the country and the one measure of successful reform. Nobody lingers on the political mechanisms through which growth is achieved. The mafia runs China rather efficiently, so why worry about how it is done, and what the “side effects” are? We obviously know of the labor camps into which people disappear without judiciary review, of torture inflicted by the personnel of state “security” organs, and of the treatment of Falun Gong, but choose to move on with our sterilized research and teaching. We ignore that China’s political system is responsible for 30 million dead from starvation in the Great Leap Forward, and 750,000 to 1.5 million murders during the Cultural Revolution. What can make Western academics stop and think twice about who they have bedded down with?

If academics don’t, who will? The World Bank and other international organizations won’t because they profit from dealing with China. Their banking relationship depends on amicable cooperation with the Party, and a de facto requirement of their research collaboration is that the final report and the public statements are acceptable to Party censors. The research departments of Western investment banks won’t because the banks’ other arms likely depend on business with China.

Does this all matter? Does it matter if China researchers ignore the political context in which they operate and the political constraints that shape their work? Does it matter if we present China to the West the way the Party leadership must like us to present China, providing narrow answers to our self-censored research questions and offering a sanitized picture of China’s political system?

The size of China’s economy will exceed that of the U.S., in purchasing power terms, by 2008 or 2009. China is a country with which Western economies are increasingly intertwined: A quarter of Chinese industry is foreign-owned and we depend on Chinese industry for cheap consumer goods. Ultimately, our pensions, invested in multinationals that increasingly produce in China, depend on the continued economic rise of China. But does the West understand that country and its rulers? At what point, and through what channels, will the Party leadership with its different views of human rights and the citizens’ rights affect our choices of political organization and political freedoms in the West (as it has affected academic research and teaching)? And to what extent are China researchers guilty of putting their own rice bowl before honest thinking and teaching?

April 2007
by Carsten A. Holz
Far Eastern Economic Review

Mr. Holz is an economist and professor in the social science division of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

从事中国研究的学者都被收买了吗？

从事中国研究的学术界人士，包括本文作者自己，习惯性地讨好中共，有时自己明确意识到了，有时没有意识到。这么做的动机是为了适应生存环境，我们通过以下方式讨好中共：提出某些研究课题或者不提出某些研究课题，报告某些事实或者忽略某些事实，我们使用的语言，我们讲授什么以及如何讲授。

外国研究人员必须要和中国研究人员合作，以便搜集数据，合写研究论文。调查要以中共接受的方式进行，调查内容限制在政治上可以被中共接受的范围里。对中国研究人员来说，这种选择是与生俱来的。西方研究人员跟从这种选择。

中国研究人员在独自进行学术研究时也要面对同样的限制。一些西方的中国研究学者在中国有亲属。另外一些人在中国有公寓。那些母语不是汉语的中国研究学者，已经投入多年时间学习语言，把自己的事业建立在这一巨大而无法转移的投入之上。通过与中国的关系，我们获取信息和观点，从中得到利益，因而我们保护这种关系。如此一来，每个人都满意，西方读者得到学术界的最新观点，我们自己得到工作上的成功，中共得到我们为他们提供的广告宣传。中国是唯一的，全体知识界都选择了同一条路：那就是不要让中共不高兴。

如果我们不合作，很明显后果会是什么。我们没法找到中国的合作伙伴。当在中国做研究的时候，我们就遇到麻烦了。李少民是香港城市大学市场系副教授（Li Shaomin, associate professor in the marketing department of City University in Hong Kong），美国公民，他在中国监狱里被关了5个月，罪名是“危害国家安全”。按李少民自己的解释，他的罪过包括对中国的政治制度持批评态度，访问台湾，得到来自台湾的经费进行敏感政治题目的研究，在中国收集研究数据。香港城市大学没有对李少民提供任何支持，获得自由之后，他马上离开那里，来到美国弗吉尼亚Old Dominion大学任教（Old Dominion University in Virginia）。人们会猜测落在中共秘密警察手里5个月对人的心理会有什么影响，中共到底用了什么手段来让李少民保持沉默。对香港知识界来说，这个信号被清楚的接收到了。

不同学科从事中国研究的学者并不是都受到同等的影响。经济学家和政治学家比较容易频繁挑战中共的禁忌，有时还很激烈。但甚至社会学家和人种学家也会在进行网络研究或少数族裔文化研究的时候涉足禁区。

我们的自我审查（self-censorship）有多种形式。我们提出和西方有关的问题，而回避和中国有关的问题。我们努力用基本的经济学指标来解释国有企业的利润，而实际上从其它角度分析可能更说明问题，比如从企业管理质量（由中共组织部任命管理层），或者企业和所有者、雇员、供应商以及顾客打交道所凭借的政治关系。但是如何能收集到反映中共对国有或政府控制的企业的影响的系统化信息呢？企业里根本没人愿意谈论这类事情。

我们谈论中国的经济单位及其发展，好像谈论西方的经济单位一样。中央和地方大量“价格管制”的规章，给了官员们极大的权力来干预价格制定的过程。但是我们接收官方公布的数字，上面说90%的商品的交易价格是市场决定的。我们不对中文词“市场”（shichang）的定义表示疑问，而把它直接翻译成“市场”（market），假设它的意思和西方的market是一样的。

与此类似，我们接受中国的公司法（Company Law）表面宣称的、没有提及中国共产党的字面意思，尽管有了公司法，中共仍然会对公司发号施令。只有深入了解，人们才会发现不容置疑的证据：中共陕西省委和陕西省政府在2006年发出联合指示，明确要求国有企业（包括公司，companies）的党支部参与一切企业决策，这个指示还要求全省所有国有企业，董事会主席和党支部书记原则上应该是同一个人。在国家一层，最大的50家中央控制的国有企业，这些在世界各地投资的国有企业，它们的最高管理人由中共政治局直接任命。经济学家不去问问：如果美国或者欧洲的执政党中央不断增加对企业的参与，会意味著什么？

中国中央银行行长兼党委书记周小川，写了大量关于用“三个代表”“全面促进中央银行工作”的中文文章。他用完全违背西方的逻辑概念的方式，论述三个代表是“宏观经济的指导原则”。但是我们以对待西方中央银行行长的认真态度对待这个人，好像中国的中央银行真的制定货币政策，好像中国的货币政策的操作渠道，以及对经济的影响，和西方一样。

我们很幼稚吗？或者我们忽略中央银行行长的第二身份－－或者第一身份－－中共党委书记，是合适的？我们下意识的回避了某些我们不理解的事情？或者我们只是因为它们不符合西方经济学概念而假装看不见？

连篇累牍的文章探讨中国收入分化日渐增加的原因。我们忽略了这样一个事实：中国拥有一亿元（1千3百万美元）或更多个人财产的3,220个人里，2,932人是中共高干的子女。五个最重要的工业领域，金融，外贸，地产开发，大型工程和安全，85%到90%的核心职位控制在中共高干子女手里。

每次改革或调整的项目出台，高干都从中自肥：价格双轨体系，贷款黑洞，国有企业财产剥离，投资公司资金和私人养老资金的滥用。不合规则的农村土地并入城市应该可以被定义为地方官僚发动的“有系统的抢劫”。地方高官有大笔投资在安全没有保证的小煤矿，这些小煤矿理论上说应该关闭，但是没人知道为什么它们依然在运转。

经济信息的普遍匮乏决定了我们的研究。当前特定课题的统计数字，都是国家统计局按照中共中央委员会和国务院的特定指示收集的。这类信息基本不会公布。而那些公布的信息的质量都要打个大问号。官方统计数字之外，各级政府部门都收集并控制内部信息。公布的信息一般往往是宣传，出于某种隐秘的动机才加以发布。研究中国经济的经济学家采取的一个办法是，放弃进行精确的调查，而是在方便的假设基础上建立抽象的经济学模型：假设有完美的竞争，新技术带来最大利润，消费和金融限制之下的家计效用最大化（household utility maximization），等等。这种办法能在多大程度上反映真实的中国还很难说。

其他研究中国经济的人公开接受中共的青睐。我们可以运用关系联络政府高官。在做实地考察的时候我们会得到地方政府和地方党委的接待，有一次，他们给我提供了一辆车，一名高官和一个地方官。他们给我介绍了一个企业主管，可以想象，他的答案都是没有任何问题的。陪同人员毫无例外都很支持，但我最终完全在他们设计的盒子里工作（这大概是我唯一没有完成的研究项目）。更有甚者，那些采访官员的人可能不仅是无意中作了中共的工具，而且可能作了政府内斗的工具。

我们大量使用符合中共自我包装的形象的语言。难道“对法律和政府充满敌意的秘密社团”，不是对中共行动的隐秘性和置于法律之上的统治方式的准确描述吗？在Webster“新世界大学字典上”（Webster’s New World College Dictionary），这是“黑手党”（mafia）的定义。

我们使用中国“政府”这个名词，却不进一步说明95%的“政府高官”是中共党员，关键决策是这些人在党务工作会议上决定的，政府人事部和党委组织部实际上是同一套人员，监察部和中共纪律委员会实际上是同一套人员，中华人民共和国中央军事委员会和中国共产党中央军事委员会是100%同一套人员。中国政府是在管理中国？还是仅仅作为中共的一个器官执行中共的决定？通过使用“政府”这个词，让中国“政府”等同于其他政府、特别是西方政府是正确的做法吗？把它称为“有中国特色的政府”甚至“黑手党的前台代表”，是不是更加准确呢？谁质疑中共统治中国的合法性，以及中共的统治方式呢？

中共的－－或者说黑手党的－－名词充满我们的写作和授课。我们不去问中国共产党是不是共产主义者，人民代表大会是不是代表人民，人民解放军是解放还是压迫人民，或者法官们是不是都由中共任命并且服从中共。我们说“天安门事件”，与中共的语言相一致，而在1989年天安门大屠杀刚发生后，我们称之为“天安门大屠杀”，那时用“事件”来称呼让我们显得对中共太顺从。

Zeng - TIME Most Influential person but unknown in China

I was completely moved by Zeng Jinyan and Hujia's stories when I first time heard from a friend. But, as usual there is no way to find further info from Chinese media.

Last a couple of weeks, some foreign medias started talking there were four Chinese people in “TIME 100 the most Influential People in the World”, but in China the newspaper, website have been just highlight Hu, Liu and Ma but absolutely ignored existent of Zeng Jinyan, 22 years old Chinese girl who live in Beijing, well know in the world community. And, still the largest part of general population in China doesn’t know Zeng Jinyan, the annual world’s most influential people choiced by TIME.

Yesterday, I was chosen as one of Time magazine’s “world’s 100 most influential people” in the “heroes and pioneers” category. Congratulations, interviews, phone calls and e-mails aplenty. I was actually quite surprised. To deal with all the questions, I’ve made up a simple summary of all my answers, as thanks for all concerned friends.

昨天，就我入选美国《时代》周刊”全球最具影响力100 人”之”英雄与先驱”（以下简称100人）一事，祝贺、采访和约稿的电话、电邮很多，反而让我觉得意外。面对这些问题，我简单归纳了回答，以答谢关注的朋友。

Q: How did you feel when you learned you’d been selected as one of Time’s ‘100′?

A: Yesterday morning, a Mr. Cai was the first to tell me, over e-mail, that Time had released its 100 list and I was on it.

Time reporters and photographers began to get in touch with me in fall last year. At the time they didn’t say exactly for what the interview and photos would be used. So yesterday when I was able to confirm that my name was on Time’s 100 list, I was quite happy. When the journalist phoned last year for an interview, I was a bit surprised. Whether you’re looking worldwide, in China, or even here in Beijing where we live, there’s way too many people far more influential than I am. I’m quite young, just doing work which to a large extent is not paid any attention by mainstream Chinese society, but I’m also the wife of an illegally monitored “activist” who’s often kidnapped or disappeared by police. My name’s been blocked from all mainland media—in brief, a tather particular role in society, but not one that I thought would make me one of the 100.

But no matter what, I see this as Time giving me some encouragement, an affirmation of the work I did in 2006. I sent a text message to my parents and grandparents way off in Fujian province to let them know, and phoned Hu Jia’s mother to let her know.

May 4, this day is Chen Guangcheng’s son Kerui’s fourth birthday. I’ve been keeping it in mind all along, and this morning when I woke up I got Hu Jia to send [Chen Guangcheng’s wife] Yuan Weijing a short message to congratulate the kid. In my mind, this day belongs to little Kerui. I had to get on the road, so I just hastily posted news about the 100 list up on my blog, and we stuck to our original plan to head out to Miyun Reservoir for a party with some friends, and also because of some other things, we didn’t get home until close to one a.m. and have only been able to reply now.

问：得知自己名列《时代》100人，有什么感受？

答：昨天早上，蔡先生通过电子邮件第一个告诉我《时代》公布的100 人里有我。

《时代》的记者和摄影师去年秋天开始和我联系，当时没有明确说明采访和拍照的目的。所以昨天确定地得知《时代》公布的100 人上有我的名字，我觉得高兴。倒是去年记者电话采访我时，我有点意外。不管是世界范围内，还是在中国国内，哪怕是在我们居住的北京，比我影响力大的人太多了。我年轻，做的是中国主流社会关注程度不高的社会工作，又是一个被警察经常绑架失踪、非法监禁的”活跃分子”的妻子，我的名字还被大陆的各个媒体封杀 ——总之社会角色很特殊，我没有想过自己会成为100 人之一。

无论如何，我觉得这是《时代》给我的一种鼓励，是对我2006 年的工作的肯定。我发手机短信把这条消息告诉我远在福建的父母、干爸干妈，又打电话给胡佳的母亲。

5 月4日 这一天是陈光诚的儿子克睿的4岁生日，之前我一直惦记着，早晨醒来我就让胡佳先给袁伟静发短消息祝福小孩子，在我心中这一天是属于小克睿的节日。因为要赶路，所以匆匆通过电子邮件把关于 100人的消息发到博客，我们按原计划出发到密云水库和朋友聚会，又因为其他一些事情，到夜里近一点才回到家，所以今天才回应。

Q: What do you think the reasons were why you were included in the 100?

A: I’m not sure what standards Time uses in selecting the 100, I can only guess.

My use of blogging could be one reason why I was selected. In this country we have no freedom of speech, the media are first and foremost “the Party’s mouthpiece”, and journalists and media’s right to continued existence lies in the hands of the Central Propaganda Department. Even if top-notch media workers can still sometimes break through news censorship, they’ve still no chance for long-term investigative reporting into the incidents and problems of society’s lower levels’ most in need of attention. After personally interacting with weaker groups in society, personally investigating some related social problems, and as I began reading some credible English-language reports and academic studies, I finally understood that we Chinese citizens live in a society of lies, that just like the Central Propaganda Department is just like the Ministry of Truth in “1984″, using its own language each day to “change history”, “rewrite the truth”. As well as ordering Chinese news outlets to produce “deeply-moving, positive and helpful news reports”. In a rejection of fake news, fake renditions of the truth, more and more Chinese are opening their own independent news outlets online—blogs, which even if they don’t report on major national incidents, they can still record the hundreds of different nuances to society that they see around them, even if it just a few casual “sincere” lines on their blog. In real life, people are worried about creating trouble and so tend to be rather unresponsive to political problems. But when anonymous on the internet, you can see the countless and passionate opinions strongly concerned with Chinese society, netizens tearing away at current events. And as mainstream media are unable to report on such important events and topics as illegal house arrests, forced disappearances and the civil rights and civil society movements, blogs have become a platform and a chance through which social works and independent thinkers can interact with the public. In 2006 when I opened a blog to continue writing about Hu Jia’s disappearance and long-term house arrest and my own life of being followed, as well as the stories of those with similar experiences in China, it attracted many people’s attention. Especially while Hu Jia had disappeared, my blog came to act as a rescue center, things I’d never before imagined possible. Blogs have become a tool for those in the civil rights movement, those in citizen social work, and even as a way to protect family members, and as long as people record truthful portrayals of what they encounter, it’s guaranteed that their blog content will stand out from others. The only pity is that since September 9, 2006, my blog has been blocked by police and cannot be directly viewed from within China. Even my own blog I often am able only to update it via e-mail.

There’s so many outstanding bloggers in China, be they of literary talent or depth, there’s no way I can be considered the best. That’s why blogging can’t be the only reason for my having been entered. Because incidents of illegal arrest and disappearing in China continue to increase? Because in my process of writing I make use of the impact human rights education and social work have had on me? Because people in China, even the world, pay close attention to the civil rights movment and resistances and struggles of ‘weak groups’ and lower-class citizens? Because in 2006 I wrote too many reports and letters requesting assistance to the United Nations, human rights groups, AIDS workers and environmentalists, the European Union and others with real influence, calling for too many people to join me in writing letters to Chinese leaders? Because after Hu Jia disappeared I successfully held a press conference for foreign correspondents stationed in Beijing, allowing media friends to spread my appeals to the world?

Some people say it’s to do with my bravery. I’m ashamed. Nobody knows how fearful I used to be, or how forebearing I was. In 2004 when Hu Jia first began to disappear or be placed under house arrest, I’d go searching for him, but mostly just waited for him to come back from the police. When the secret police found out where I went to university, they went through the campus Party Committee to tell me “not to continue associating with Hu Jia”, “stop wasting time on AIDS social work”, or else “start worrying about your diploma”, I was often so scared that I’d just stay quiet. Really. In 2006 between the disappearances and the house arrests, I began to learn how to fight back, and gradually stopped being so scared. Because I’d finally realized that if I can’t even protect the people I love the most, what else do I have to lose? What else am I scared of? If people can’t live with dignity, what use is there in suffering in silence? If I live in constant fear of unseen dark forces from the powerful regime and my work is thwarted, then what are the seniors, children, patients and volunteers in the AIDS villages supposed to do? Those family members of rights upholders who’ve had to deal with so much more trouble than I have, like Chen Guangcheng’s wife and son, what are they to do? I believe that as long as justice exists in our hearts, bravery follows in suit. My religious faith has also given me great support, helping me escape from fear. The smiles of my buddhist master and Buddha himself often appear in my mind, renewing my energy. Buddha says all life must deal with so some sort of pain, so I say bring it on! I gradually release my fear, but even if I’m often furious, annoyed or hurt, I still have never lost my faith.

问：你认为什么原因使你能够名列 100人？

答：我不清楚《时代》用什么准则和标准来挑选这 100人，只能做些猜想。

博客的运用可能是我入选的其中一个原因。在我们这个没有言论自由的国家，新闻媒体首先是”党的喉舌”，记者和媒体的”生杀大权”都被中宣部掌控。纵使优秀的媒体工作者能偶尔突破新闻审查，也无法长期全面深入地报道社会底层最需要关注的事件和问题。在亲身接触社会弱势群体，亲自调查一些相关的社会问题，在开始阅读具有公信力的英文报道和学术报告后，我才明白，我们中国公民生活在一个谎言社会里，中宣传部就是《 1984》” 真理部”，每日用它的语言”修改历史”、”编写事实”。并指导、命令国内新闻机构作”感人至深的正面有益的新闻报道”。为了拒绝虚假的新闻，描述真相，越来越多的中国人，在网络开办自己独立的新闻机构——博客，就算不报道国家大事，也可以如实地记叙身边的社会百态，甚至只是在博客上说些”真心”的闲话。在现实生活中，人们因为担心惹麻烦对政治性话题很冷感。在可以匿名的网络上，你会发现无数热情关注中国社会现状、抨击时政的网民。而对于主流媒体不能报道的非法软禁、逼迫失踪、维权以及公民社会运动的重要事件等话题，博客成为社会工作者、有独立思想人士的一个平台和接触公众的机会。 2006年我通过博客持续讲述胡佳的失踪、长期软禁和我被跟踪的生活，以及中国类似遭遇者的故事，引起很多朋友的关注。尤其是胡佳失踪时，博客成为一个营救平台，发挥了我事先未曾想到的作用。博客成为维权运动、公民社会工作、甚至保护家人的一个很好的工具，而只要是记录个案描写个人的真实遭遇，就注定了博客内容与众不同。唯一遗憾的是， 2006年 9月份前后，我的博客被网络警察屏蔽后，在中国大陆就再也无法直接访问了。我连自己更新博客都常常要借助电子邮件。

中国优秀的博客作者众多，无论文采、深度，我都不能算是最好的。所以写博客这一形式肯定不是入选的唯一因素。因为中国的非法拘禁、失踪事件越来越多？因为我在写博客的过程中，实践着人权教育和社会工作对我的影响？因为中国乃至世界的人民非常关注中国维权运动与弱势群体和底层人民的反抗、挣扎？因为2006 年我给联合国机构、人权组织、艾滋病和环保人士、欧盟等真正有影响力的人写了太多的报告和求助信，还号召太多的人和我一起给中国的领导人写信？因为胡佳失踪时我成功地召开了世界各国驻北京记者的招待会，让媒体朋友把我的请求传遍世界？

有些人说是因为我的勇气。我很惭愧。大家不知道我以前是多么地恐惧，又是如何地隐忍。胡佳从2004 年开始就频繁地失踪或被软禁，我寻找过他，但更多地只是等待他从警察手里回来。当国保警察找到我的大学，通过学校党委要求我”不要和胡佳继续交往”、”不要花时间在艾滋病社会工作上”，否则”小心毕业证书”时，我是多么害怕以至于常常沉默。是的，06 年的失踪和软禁事件中我开始学着反抗后，渐渐地不再恐惧了。因为我终于意识到，如果最心爱的人我都不能守护，我还有什么可以失去呢？我还害怕什么呢？如果人不能有尊严地活着，苟且隐忍又有什么意义呢？如果我总是害怕来自政权强大的看不见的黑势力，那我的工作受阻，在艾滋病村的老人、小孩、病人还有志愿者又怎么办呢？那些比我遭受更多磨难的维权人士的家属，如陈光诚的妻儿怎么办呢？相信只要心中存有正义，勇气自然而来。我的宗教信仰也给了我很大的支持，帮助我从恐惧中解脱。根本上师和佛祖的笑颜常常突然出现在我脑海中，让我充满力量。佛祖说人生终归会受各种各样的苦，那就坦然面对吧！于是我渐渐地放下恐惧，纵然时常气愤、恼怒、悲痛，但从来不失去信心。

Q: What sort of influence or changes will the list bring to you?

A: If it hadn’t been for all the friends and journalists sending me congratulations and questions, I wouldn’t even have noticed. Time is one of the world’s most influential media, so releasing this list will of course allow many people to know who these 100 are. But this can only represent a confirmation of work and contributions of the past, people will quickly forget and go look at the next new list, new incidents. This is why I never realized or thought that the being on the 100 list might bring me any effect or change. For the future I’m going going to stick with my social work; my methods won’t change because of this. Temporary international renown might make me feel safer, especially now that I’m pregnant. I think in 2007 or 2008 they might keep following me, keeping me under house arrest, but they won’t go so far as to throw me in jail. But then who knows what might actually end up happening? The friend we’re most concerned about, blind barefoot doctor Chen Guangcheng, was also chosen by Time as one of their 100 heroes and pioneers, which brought him a high degree of attention from world media, the political world and civilians, but as a retaliation for the outstanding civil rights work he did, until today he’s still in prison.

Then some friends told us that yesterday when they phoned us at home or to my cell, they got messages saying the number was out of service or had been disconnected, to try again, and even a busy signal. I definitely did use the phone a few times, but even when I wasn’t it still appeared busy. Then it got worse, as mainland papers went covering the land and sky with news that Hu Jintao and Liu Qi had made the 100, but there were no mentions of me. I was prepared for something like this, so at first I didn’t want to say anything. Who knew people would start phoning me at home to find out why. What could I do? If I didn’t explain it would have seemed like I was lying, but to explain in detail would just hurt my family. Some netizens got confused too, asking: “are mainland media being censored or are foreign media spreading lies?”

问：名列100人会给你将来带来什么影响和改变？

答：如果不是那么多朋友和记者的祝贺与提问，我意识不到这个问题。《时代》是具有世界影响力的媒体，发布名单肯定会让更多人知道这100 人。但是这只能代表着对过去工作和贡献的肯定，很快人们就会忘了，而去看新的名单、新的事件。所以我没有意识到也没有想过名列100 人会给我的将来带来什么影响和改变。将来要做的社会工作照做，方式也不会因此而改变。一时的国际知名度可能会让我更加安全，再加上我现在怀孩子，我想07 、08年他们也许会跟踪、软禁我，但不至于把我投到监狱。可是谁知道究竟会发生什么事情呢？我们最关心的朋友，盲人赤脚律师陈光诚，去年也是《时代》 100人的英雄与先驱，受到世界媒体、政界、民间的高度关注，但是他因出色的维权工作遭到报复，至今还在监狱中。

倒是一些朋友告诉我们，当他们昨天拨打我家的电话和我的手机时，听到的答复是电话有故障或无此号码、请查实，甚至手机显示正在忙——有时我确实在接电话，有时我根本没有使用手机时它也显示忙音。后来更麻烦，因为国内的报纸在铺天盖地地报道胡锦涛和刘淇入选100 人，没有关于我的介绍，对此我早有思想准备，所以原本不想说什么，谁知家里来电话追问为什么。我怎么办呢，不解释似乎我在撒谎，详细解释原因岂不是叫家人伤心！一些网友也迷惑，问”是国内媒体封锁还是国外媒体造谣”？

Q: How do you feel about being listed alongside Chairman Hu Jintao?

A: No special feeling. Our roles in society are too different. China has the highest population in the world, our economy ranks in the top few places, our system’s authority overrules our laws, the Party is bigger than the state. As the representative of a large country under this kind of system, Chairman Hu Jintao undoubtedly has greater influence. Time must have its own factors to consider in compiling the list.

Hu Jia and I are just average people, I work in a small company to make some money to feed the family, doing AIDS care, relief and rights protection work in my free time. Hu Jia is self-employed right now, or as the police put it, “urban unemployed.”

I have no special feeling about being listed alongside Hu Jintao, and have no complaints against this particular person. But, Chinese judiciary bodies suppress civil society and those who uphold rights; as Chairman he needs to take responsibility. Sometimes I’ll hope that the “leaders with conscience” within the higher levels of the Chinese government will speed up the push for social and political reforms, and in wiping out corruption, reducing the weight pressing down on the heads of the common people, allowing Chinese society to effectively improve and granting its people freedom and happiness. But, as the government releases increasingly strict internet and news censorship, policies that strike down on the people, the sheer majority of the time I don’t feel disenchanted with the authorities. I believe the future will be better, but that it needs everyone’s effort, struggle and strife, and not just waiting for the rulers’ bestowing of it upon us at some indefinite point in the future.

问：与胡锦涛主席同列一榜，有何特别感想？

答：没有特别的感受，我们的社会角色很不相同。我国是世界人口最多的国家，经济总量排在前几位，而我们体制权大于法，党大于国。胡锦涛主席作为一个大国如此体制下的最高权力代表，毫无疑问有着巨大的影响力。入选《时代》肯定有它考虑的因素。

我和胡佳都是普通人，我在一家小公司做一点工作挣钱养家，剩下的时间做艾滋病关怀、救助和维权工作。胡佳现在是自由职业者，抑或警方所言的”城市无业人员”。

我对与胡锦涛同榜没有特别的感想，对他个人也没有抱怨。但是，中国司法部门对公民社会和维权人士的镇压，作为主席的他需要负责任。偶尔我会希望中国政府高层的”有良知的领导人”加速推动社会政治改革，以消除腐败弊端，减轻压在老百姓头上的重压，让中国社会真正进步，让人民自由而幸福。可是，随着政府出台越来越严厉的对网络和新闻审查、对民间打压的政策，绝大多数时候我不对当局抱幻想。我相信将来会更好，但是必须通过每一个的努力、挣扎和奋斗，而非等待统治者遥遥无期的” 恩赐”。

cite: John Kennedy, Global Voice

Shanghai vs. Tibet

2007第一季收入排行

上海人最富 西藏人最低

中国一方面经济持续发展，另一方面城乡居民生活水平差距也日益增大，中国统计局的统计数据显示，全国31个省市中有24个人均可支配收入低于平均值，收入最低的西藏人平均可支配收入不仅低于中平均水平，甚至不及最富的上海人的一半，只有其三分之一略多一些。

根据中国统计局最新的统计显示，第一季城镇居民家庭平均每人可支配收入为人民币3934.94元，同比增长19.5%，扣除价格因素，实际增长16.6%，增幅高于上年同期五点八个百分点。

第一季城镇居民家庭收支基本情况中，上海城镇家庭以人均可支配收入人民币6795.52元居首，其次是浙江的6676.11元，再次是北京的5901.17元，第四是广东的5283.03元，第五是江苏的4847.7元。

不过，西藏城镇家庭的人均可支配收入只有2436.61元，名列各省市之末，不仅远低于中国各地平均值的3934.94元，更只有上海的三分之一略多一点。

排名倒数第二名的甘肃也只有2449.25元，仅比西藏多12.64元，倒数第三名的青海为2594.65元，同样远低于平均值，还不到排名第四的广东的一半。

至于新疆、宁夏、贵州以及东北地区的黑龙江、吉林、辽宁等地的人均可支配收入均不及三千元，也都在平均值之下。

此外，根据统计局的数据显示，中国三十一个省市之中有二十四个的人均可支配收入低于平均值，只有七个高于平均值，换言之，各地的城乡居民生活水平不仅明显呈现差异，且财富集中在少数的地区的民众所享有，而大多数地区及其民众的生活是在平均水平之下。

中国社科院此前发表的2007年《中国社会蓝皮书》也点名收入差距的问题，书中指中国收入最高的20%人口与最低收入者的实际收入差距约十八倍，且差距仍在向纵深发展。过去城乡差距和地区差距要比总体的差距小很多，特别是东部地区率先发展之后，东部的收入差距显得很大。但现在西部已经超过东部，而且农民内部差距比较突出。

据悉，近几年，中国经济的增长过分依赖于投资，外贸依存度高达70%左右。在这种情况下，十三亿人口的大国，持续、稳定的经济增长，不能完全依赖于进出口贸易。而是要依靠内需，不过，由于整个收入分配差距很大，造成整个国家的消费和内需难以扩大。

国家发改委曾发表报告，坦承政府调节收入力度不够。数据显示，2005年全国征收的个人所得税占各项税收的比例只有7.3%，占居民总收入的比例只有2.5%。同期，在政府财政支出中，用于抚恤、社会福利救济和社会保障的补助支出的费用占居民总收入的比例只有3%。

有分析认为，中国社会当前“最不和谐的音符”就是日益扩大的城乡收入差距。有专家则指出，中国政府需要解决的是增加农民的收入，深化体制改革，建立覆盖城乡的公共财政制度、建立城乡统一的劳动力市场和土地市场、深化农村金融改革、建立城乡一体的户籍管理制度，以便将土地的增值收益更多留给农民，把农村的资金更多留在农村，让农民能更多分享农产品加工和流通领域的利润。

piss me off

"Pay, I don't care. This is not my money." Again, someone who is working in a development field keep making such statement. Is that a right attitude? If one doesn't want to make a best use of other's resources, and continually marking irresponsible decisions, then from my point of view, this person shouldn't be in a development field, and this kind of so called "development program" won't help people who needs the help. Anyway development work is such a crab.

Myanmar trip 4, Inle Lake

Born and grow up in a place where surrounded by mountains, Inle Lake is a complete different and unique site even in Myanmar itself. With only $5, I had such a nice room just next to where boats anchor. I still clearly remember the hiking trail, biking road, and chating at local markets... so much fun

Only transportation, boat! and some traffic along with the ake market as well


习惯了周围都是山。突然看到水上人家，觉得这种生活超酷、超自由。

The leg roweing fishermen is very unusual characteristic in Inle Lake. They are just like dancers, or even artists.

Pagodas, monks, temples are every where in Myanmar.

toy and game, they play every day in their home village.

I love Myanmar salad, especially those just one the street. But, not this one that makes mouth complete red.

怀柔治藏“造血” 继续ing

进藏在现在的中国是一个标签。

援藏是政策需要，是政府行为。每年在各机关企事业挂着“援藏干部”的招牌，在“特别能吃苦、特别能战斗、特别能忍耐、特别能团结、特别能奉献”的口号下，N人进藏。是“输血”？是“造血”？还是“成为植物人”？也只有胜利者才有权利去勾画这段历史了。 自叹 History is written by the victor.

而以个人行为自成一派的就要数藏漂一族了。他们自称与内地一般汉族很不一样，基本上是划清界限。他们洋洋自得，称自己是有理想、有资本、有个性、有爱心的自愿“援藏”部队。他们色彩艳丽的冲风衣（多为NorthFace之类的名牌）、牛仔帽、腰包、太阳镜是专有的装备。走在大街小巷特自信。但我到觉得一位朋友对藏漂的解释才是一针见血“失恋、失意和失败的人”。

夏天了，虽然在下雪下雨，很冷；但看来什么也阻挡不了“援藏”的进程。我们还是要接待那些寻找自己、寻找解脱的汉族同胞，我们还是要高歌党对西藏无私的关爱。

今天又看到新一轮援藏线路的规划，让我想起“强”一个异族好朋友发来的信息：“刚新闻说，五一期间布达拉宫团体门票开始预售，交代了一大堆团票预订的程序和注意事项。我有时想，如果达赖回西藏就好了，至少布达拉宫不会那么肆无忌惮地伺候游客去。”事实也如此，但......

中国各地各机关企业新一轮援藏线路日前划定，在北京怀柔治藏的方略下，援藏队伍、援藏资金、援藏项目业已圈定，全国援藏工作的力度不断加大、领域不断拓宽、内涵不断深化，新一轮援藏凸现重“输血”更重“造血”新特征。

官方《人民政协报》早前披露，“中共中央适时调整充实了西藏工作协调小组，加大了领导力度，强化了协调职能。中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席贾庆林亲自担任组长，国务委员、公安部部长周永康，国务委员、国务院秘书长华建敏，全国政协副主席、中央统战部部长刘延东任副组长，成员增加了西藏自治区党委、国家发改委、财政部和国家宗教局的负责同志，协调机制进一步健全。”

有分析称，由政协主席贾庆林担纲领导西藏协调小组，再加上公安部长周永康和统战部长刘延东，充分显示北京政府采取怀柔与铁腕相结合，以怀柔为主的治藏方针。

尤其是加上发改委、财政部等高层进入小组，就是要“加强对西藏发展问题的宏观指导和综合协调，加大对其他藏区的关注和支持力度”，以确保西藏经济社会实现跨越式发展，西藏人民生活水平不断提高，来与流亡海外的达赖集团争取民心。因此，中央援藏项目也以改善农牧民生活为重点。

中新网的报道说，自1994年7月开始，中央第三次西藏工作座谈会作出了由经济较为发达的地区支持西藏建设和发展的重大决策。2001年6月，中央第四次西藏工作座谈会决定，将对口援藏工作在原定十年的基础上再延长十年，并扩大了对口支持范围，将西藏未与内地建立对口支持关系的三十个县区全部纳入支持范围。

报道说，中央确定的援藏方略，为西藏带来了新观念、新思路、新血液、新活力、新气象。目前，西藏与内地经济合作不断加强，对外贸易快速增长，新的开放格局正在形成，全区城乡面貌发生巨大变化，人民生活水平不断提高，社会局势日益稳定，正处于西藏历史上最好的发展时期。

今年，恰逢第四、第五批援藏人员接力之期。3月底至4月上旬，西藏自治区党委、政府主要负责人分率七个代表团，赴全国各援藏省市、中央企业进行了空前的高规格、高密度、高礼遇的回访答谢活动。

西藏党政代表团所到之处，无不受到当地最高礼遇，各个省市、中直国家机关和中央企业党政“一把手”几乎全部出面与西藏共商合作发展大计，祖国民族大家庭的骨肉深情，成为近段时间西藏最热门话题。西藏党政代表团乘兴归来时，权威人士称此次参访是“盛况空前，群贤毕至，满载而归”。

据初步统计，上海市确定援藏投入在2.8亿元的基础上，保持两位数增长；湖南省初步确定了援藏项目资金总盘子；广东省明确表示，援藏项目的投入进一步加大力度；黑龙江省将采取“捆绑式”对口支持方式，援藏资金递增20%；吉林省提出援藏项目、资金计划总额将不低于1.1亿万元；安徽省援藏项目增幅将达33%；湖北省做到援藏增长幅度估算将达17%；陕西省决定援藏资金增加到每年1600万元；重庆市援藏资金增幅达19%；江苏省把援藏资金纳入江苏省财政专项资金账户进行管理；山东省力争援藏资金增幅不低于25%；北京市在进一步完善援藏机制的同时，将增加援藏项目资金；福建省提出拓宽领域、丰富内涵、创新机制的援藏思路，并将增加教育、卫生等方面的援藏干部；浙江省确定进一步增加援藏项目和资金；辽宁省将争取实现援藏资金、援藏干部“两个提高”；天津市决定将对口支持资金增加1800万元；河北省确定三年对口支持阿里地区资金比第四批增加1500万元。

援藏的中央重要骨干企业表示，将加大力度，拓展领域，一如既往地做好对口支持工作，为西藏经济社会跨越式发展和长治久安作出更大的贡献。